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World War II, a fundamental objective of the foreign
policy of the United States has been to strengthen political
and economic relationships among free-world nations. An integral
element of this policy has been the expansion of international
trade on mutually beneficial terms. The legal and practical problems of reducing or eliminating restrictions on the international
movement of commodities have therefore assumed a major importance.
International commodity transactions have traditionally been
subject to a wide range of such restrictions. In the case of imports,
the most familiar barriers are tariffs and formal quotas or embargoes imposed by national governments. In recent years, however, the major industrialized nations have tended toward a
gradual reduction in tariff levels. Concurrently with this trend,
and partially in consequence of it, there has developed an increasing awareness that other forms of import restrictions may constitute equal or even greater obstacles to trade.
It must be anticipated that nations will tend to rely increasingly upon non-tariff import restrictions if tariffs continue to be
reduced. The present discussion describes the principal types of
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these restrictions which are prevalent today and analyzes the substantive and procedural authority of the President under United
States law to persuade other nations to remove them.
In order to confine the discussion within manageable bounds,
the following limitations have been adopted:
First, the extensive and complex field of import controls applicable to agricultural and comparable products is not considered. Restrictions in that area are conditioned by specialized
economic and political factors, which are frequently reflected in
the existence of domestic subsidy programs. National policies that
have been evolved to deal with imports of these products are
correspondingly specialized and are therefore not always representative of the more general problems presented by non-tariff
trade barriers applicable to other types of commodities.1
Second, no consideration is given to restrictions applicable to
capital movements, the physical transfer of securities, or similar
international transactions. Restrictions on the availability and
cost of foreign exchange are included only insofar as they are
relevant to the discussion of obstacles to commodity imports.
Third, although no consideration is given to tariffs per se,
reference is made to certain specialized types of tariffs, such as
tariff quotas and multi-column preferential tariffs, which have
restrictive characteristics in addition to those inherent in tariff
schedules of general applicability. Consideration is also given to
additional forms of customs levies, such as surcharges, import
taxes, supplementary taxes, and similar devices.
Fourth, although domestic economic measures as such are not
discussed, mention is made of subsidy and similar programs within
the importing country insofar as they may have the effect of
placing imported commodities at a competitive disadvantage.
Fifth, commercial factors, including differences in specifica1 The omission of non-tariff restrictions on agricultural imports is not intended to
suggest that they are less widespread or less significant than restrictions applicable to
non-agricultural imports. The reverse is frequently true. Restrictions in the agricultural
field are often more extensive than those in other areas and are usually more difficult
to eliminate. The recent "chicken war" between the United States and the European
Economic Community is one of many examples of their potentially disruptive impact on
world trade. A 1962 GATT report points out, "There has been extensive resort to
the use of nontariff devices, whether or not in conformity with the General Agreement,
which, in many cases, has impaired or nullified tariff concessions or other benefits which
agricultural exporting countries expect to receive from the General Agreement • • • •
These developments are of such a character that either they have weakened or threaten
to weaken the operation of the General Agreement as an instrument for the promotion
of mutually advantageous trade." GATT, TRADE IN AGRICULTIJRAL PRODUCTS 25 (1962).
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tions or consumer preferences between national markets and such
competitive considerations as cost disparities, are no more than
mentioned, although they may often constitute substantial deterrents to international trade. 2
l.

THE BACKGROUND

With the passage of the Trade Expansion Act of 19623 and
the preparations thereafter initiated for further multilateral tariff
negotiations pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade,4 the United States has continued its firm commitment to
the belief that an expansion in the volume of international trade
will promote its economic, political and social objectives, and will
strengthen the alliance of free nations. President Kennedy characterized the Trade Expansion Act as "the most important international piece of legislation . . . affecting economics since the
passage of the Marshall Plan," and asserted that it "marks a
decisive point for the future of our economy, for our relations
with our friends and allies, and for the prospects of free institutions and free societies everywhere." 5
One of the principal premises underlying the Trade Expansion
Act has been its anticipated role in promoting the commercial
export trade of the United States and thereby alleviating the
international payments deficits that this country has experienced
in recent years. President Kennedy described the act as "the pri2 The significance of these commercial factors is too self-evident to require documentation. For one typical summary, see statement by the Automobile Manufacturers
Association, Hearings on R.R. 9900 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4080-83, 4087-88 (1962). The hearings contain numerous comparable
examples.
8 76 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (Supp. IV, 1963).
4 The United States became a party to the General Agreement pursuant to an
executive agreement concluded by the president. Proclamation No. 2671A, 12 Fed. Reg.
8863 (1947). Presidential action was based on authority delegated by the trade agreements
legislation.
5 47 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 655 (1962). More recently, Christian Herter, United States
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, summarized the principal purposes of
the act as follows:
"To increase the security and well-being of the United States and the Free World
through the expansion of trade, with the consequent benefits to industries and workers.
"To strengthen Atlantic ties and enlarge the area of interdependence within an
Atlantic Community and with industrialized countries such as Britain, Japan, Australia
and Canada.
"To stimulate the economic growth of the less developed nations by offering access
to world markets for their products and encouraging commercial policies on their part
which are conducive to their own development and to fruitful world trade." U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, lNT'L COMMERCE 10-11 (Sept. 23, 1963).
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mary long-term means" of reversing the recent decline in the
commercial trade surplus and stated that it should "open new
markets and widen existing markets for American exports." 6
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, testifying in support
of the bill, pointed out that an expansion in the export trade of
the United States "has become an urgent national need." 7 He
reasoned:
"If tariffs on our exports and imports are reduced to a comparable extent, the neutral assumption would be that exports
and imports would rise by the same percentage. As a result,
the American trade surplus would become larger.
"Conditions now evident, and likely to persist for a number of years, make it more likely, however, that American
exports to Western Europe would rise by a greater percentage than the exports of Western European countries to the
United States." 8

There can be no question, in view of the recurring deficits in
the United States balance of payments, that the expansion of commercial exports must be an important and continuing objective
of national policy. So long as our foreign dollar expenditures for
programs of military and economic assistance remain at substantial levels, a countervailing increase in the commercial trade surplus would be clearly preferable to other, usually more restrictive,
methods of reducing the payments deficit.
To assist in achieving this objective, the executive branch in
recent years has instituted a variety of programs designed to promote the commercial export trade of the United States. The Department of Commerce has steadily expanded its activities in this
fi.eld. 9 In 1962, the President established within the Department
the office of the National Export Expansion Coordinator for the
purpose of correlating these activities with those of other departments and agencies as well as private organizations.10 These con6 President's Special Message on Balance of Payments, 109 CONG. REc. 12113 (daily ed.
July 18, 1963).
'T Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2, at 816.
8 Id. at 818.
9 There is a voluminous literature describing the Department's export promotion
activities. One brief summary appears in Commerce in 1961, 49 SEC. OF COMMERCE ANN.
REP. 61-73 (1961). The President's Special Message on Balance of Payments, 109 CoNG.
REc. 12113, 12114 (daily ed. July 18, 1963) notes that "the Department of Commerce
has developed a broad program of education and assistance to present and potential
American exporters.''
10 Draper Daniels, the first National Export Expansion Coordinator, was appointed July
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tinuing programs have been supplemented from time to time by.
additional means, such as the 1963 White House Conference on
Export Expansion. 11 Proposals have recently been made in Congress for legislation to authorize a review of the entire export promotion program and to establish a national advisory council on
export policy and operation which would examine progress and
make recommendations to the President in this area. 12
These efforts to expand the volume of commercial exports have
undoubted value.13 But experience increasingly demonstrates that
the effectiveness of export promotion programs and concomitant
attempts to negotiate reciprocal tariff reductions can be substantially vitiated in many instances by the presence of non-tariff restrictions that discriminate against imported goods. The Commission of the European Economic Community has recently
pointed out:
"The Community must give increased attention to other indirect obstacles to the free movement of goods, which are
becoming all the more conspicuous and critical as further
progress is made in the abolition of customs duties and quotas
properly so called."14
Non-tariff trade barriers are not of recent origin. Their existence has long been recognized by businessmen, government
officials, and commentators. They were discussed when the Trade
Agreements Act was under consideration in 193415 and were cited
20, 1962. For his description of the activities of his office, see Hearings on Small Business
and Foreign Trade Before the House Select Committee on Small Business, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 153-79 (1963). Government departments and agencies concerned with export
promotion include, in addition to the Department of Commerce, the Department of
State, the Treasury Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Small Business
Administration, the Agency for International Development, the Export-Import Bank, and
the United States Information Agency.
11 Held in Washington, D.C., Sept. 17-18, 1963. The conference has been followed
by a series of regional "little White House conferences" throughout the United States.
12 See S. 1614, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
18 It is probably impossible to arrive at any reliable quantitative measure of the
extent to which exports have been increased by these promotion programs. Large firms
which are already experienced in the export field are not likely to be significantly affected.
Smaller firms, particularly those that are unfamiliar with the export market, have in
many instances benefited substantially. A few illustrative figures appear in the statement
of Draper Daniels, Hearings, supra note 10, at 153-79.
14 Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Programme of the Community
for the Second Stage 11 (Oct. 24, 1962). To the same effect, see EUROPEAN FREE TRADE
AssocIATION 3d ANN. REP. 6 (1963), stating that "the progressive elimination of tariffs and
quantitative restrictions means that other obstacles to trade gain in relative importance."
llS See testimony of Secretary of State Cordell Hull with respect to non-tariff import
barriers, quoted in Organization for Trade Cooperation: Hearings on H.R. 5550 Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1956).
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. in the Randall Commission Report. 16 More recently, they were
extensively referred to during the hearings on the Trade Expansion bill17 and were the subject of a 1961 staff study by a subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee.18 They have been
discussed in the proceedings of many professional and business
groups concerned with problems of international trade. 19
Despite wide recognition of the existence of these barriers,
until recently there seemed to exist a tendency on the part of some
government officials to discount their significance. Administration
statements regarding the Trade Expansion Act have occasionally
appeared to assume that a continuing policy of multinational tariff
reductions will of itself be sufficient to permit the desired expansion in the volume of international trade. 20 The comment is frequently made that restrictions other than tariffs have largely
disappeared in the industrialized countries, at least insofar as nonagricultural commodities are concerned. A recent assertion to
this effect appears in the 1963 report of the President on the trade
agreements program, which recognizes the continued existence
of non-tariff import controls in many countries but concludes that
"on the whole, industrial countries have few remaining restrictions except in the agricultural sector."21
During hearings on the Trade Expansion bill, this attitude
provoked considerable legislative criticism, which was by no means
confined to opponents of the trade agreements program. A leader
in the attempt to secure adequate recognition of the problems
posed by non-tariff barriers was Representative Curtis of Missouri,
16 COMMISSION ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS 44 (1954).
17 Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2; Hearings on H.R. 11970 Before the Senate
Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). Virtually every domestic industry
testifying on the bill provided instances of non-tariff import barriers that it had encountered abroad. A number of importers' groups cited comparable restrictions existing
in the United States. Characteristic of much of this testimony was the assertion by Paul
Douglas, President of the Sulphur Export Corporation, that United States sulphur exports
face "a veritable jungle of restrictions." Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2, at 1841.
18 SUBCOMMITrEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,
87TH CONG., !ST SESS., TRADE REsTRAINTS IN THE WESTERN COMMUNITY (1961).
19 For one recent example, see PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF TRADE
AND INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 255, 258 (1963).
20 See, e.g., the statement of Secretary Dillon quoted in text accompanying note 8
supra. The hearings on the Trade Expansion Act contain numerous similar statements.
21 PRESIDENT'S 7TH ANN. REP. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 10 (1963). The
context suggests that the reference is to formal quantitative restrictions and licensing
and exchange controls imposed primarily or entirely for balance of payment reasons. As
thus limited, the statement is probably correct. It fails to mention, however, a wide range
of other non-tariff restrictions, maintained by industrialized and less developed countries
alike, that often substantially inhibit world trade. See part II infra.
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who subsequently voted for the bill. To Representative Curtis
and others, the bill appeared to be regarded by some administration officials primarily as a tariff measure rather than as a mechanism for dealing with all forms of trade restrictions. A characteristic statement of his position appears in his comment to Under
Secretary of State George Ball:
"Tariffs probably are the most liberal of all the kinds of trade
barriers. Yet, the President's message, your statement, and
the statement yesterday [by Secretary of Commerce Hodges],
are almost confined to this very narrow band of trade barriers
which we call tariffs." 22
On a number of occasions during the hearings, administration
spokesmen were asked to submit detailed information as to nontariff barriers currently existing abroad, particularly in Europe.28
A considerable volume of this material was furnished. It related primarily to import licensing and exchange controls and
direct quantitative restrictions in the form of quotas and embargoes, although various instances of surcharges, deposit requirements, internal taxes, and certain other restrictive techniques were
also cited.24
It seems fair to conclude that although the executive branch
has kept well advised regarding formal restrictions of this type, it
has-at least until recently-possessed considerably less detailed
information concerning the informal restrictions that often result
from foreign administrative and private practices. Information of
this nature is, of course, most readily available to United States
businessmen who encounter such obstacles in seeking to sell abroad. Nevertheless, it would appear that the Department of Commerce, which has primary responsibility for the export promotion
program, could perform a potentially valuable service by undertaking further efforts to collect such data from the business community and other sources. The information could be used both to
assist prospective exporters and to advise our GATT representatives
22 Hearings, supra note 2, at 651. To the same effect see id. at 273-74. Earlier in the
testimony, Secretary Hodges had suggested to Representative Byrnes that the problem of
non-tariff barriers "is not as bad as you intimate" and had stated that "we are making
tremendous progress in getting the nations of the world, particularly the important
industrialized nations of the world, to cut down and cut out their restrictions." Id. at
161-62.
23 See, e.g., id. at 650-51, where Representative Curtis asked for "an exhaustive list"
of past and current restrictions. There are numerous additional instances.
24 Ibid. See especially 162-231, 480-600. The Department of Commerce also supplied
a "Sample List of Nontariff Barriers to Trade.'' Id. at 274-76.
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as to restrictions which they should seek to persuade other nations
to remove.25
Despite the diversity of views expressed by business spokesmen
concerning the merits of the Trade Expansion Act, they have
generally agreed that it is not likely to be successful in expanding
commercial exports unless adequate measures are taken to remove
the non-tariff, and particularly the informal, import restrictions
which domestic firms have frequently encountered abroad. 26 Various amendments for this purpose were included in the bill in the
course of legislative review.27 The conduct of the 1964 GATT negotiations will furnish an indication of the extent to which the
United States is prepared to exercise these statutory mechanisms,
and of the extent to which restrictions of this nature are capable
of being dealt with by such means.

II.

THE PRINCIPAL CATEGORIES OF NON-TARIFF IMPORT
RESTRICTIONS

It is obviously impracticable to attempt to enumerate all of the
various forms of non-tariff import barriers. Their possible number
is subject only to the limitations of human ingenuity. They may,
however, be conveniently classified into categories according to
their nature, their purpose, or the source from which they arise.
For present purposes, a further distinction exists between overt
and "hidden" barriers as it affects both the ease with which they
may be identified and the probable effectiveness of attempts to
remove them.
The most readily identifiable types of non-tariff import restrictions are those which are formally imposed by national govern25 It should be noted that in 1962 and 1963 the Department, primarily through the
Business and Defense Services Administration, has held informal meetings with a number
of industries largely for the purpose of obtaining this type of information. In addition,
it has recently circulated a questionnaire to the business community seeking further data
concerning such restrictions. It is to be hoped that these inquiries will prove sufficiently
productive to warrant an expansion of the Department's efforts.
The Role of the Trade Information Committee should also be recognized in this
regard. A primary objective of the Committee during its recent hearings in preparation
for the 1964 tariff negotiations has been to collect evidence concerning foreign non-tariff
import restrictions. See text accompanying notes 125-26 infra.
26 See, e.g., the statement of Clarence Higbee, representing the Import Committee
of the Wire and Cable Division of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association,
Hearings on R.R. 9900, supra note 2, at 2414-16. Mr. Higbee urged that the bill should
provide adequate assurance "that the executive branch will actively seek the elimination
of foreign restrictions" other than tariffs, and stated that "the administration's trade
proposals cannot be effective in promoting the export trade of the United States" unless
such restrictions are removed.
27 See part III infra.
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ments to regulate the entry of goods. They include quantitative
restrictions, mixing and tying restrictions, import licensing controls, foreign exchange controls, deposits required of importers, formal customs provisions, and customs levies other than tariffs. Intergovernmental commodity agreements, at least to the extent that
their purpose is to protect competing industries within the importing country, may also be included in this category. In addition to
these formal import controls, there also exist numerous informal
types of restrictions which are considerably more difficult to identify. They result from customs administration and procedure and
from the administration of the formal import controls. Finally, there
exist certain other types of restrictions which are unrelated to the
entry of goods as such; these include government procurement policies, internal tax policies, subsidy programs which accord an advantage to domestic industries, and various private practices.
These methods by which imports may be controlled should be
distinguished from the purposes motivating the restrictions. The
latter include protection of the national security, relief of injury
caused by trade concessions, conservation of foreign exchange,
encouragement of domestic industries, protection of public health,
safety or morals, prevention of unfair competitive practices, and
various other objectives which may be as numerous as the problems from which they arise. This distinction has considerable significance, since the availability and efficacy of legal and diplomatic
procedures to remove such restrictions will depend both on their
nature and on the reasons for their imposition.

A. Formal Restrictions on the Entry of Goods
I. Formal Quantitative Restrictions
In a sense, all government import controls other than tariffs,
other customs levies, and deposit requirements can be considered
quantitative restrictions, since they operate directly by limiting
the volume of imports rather than indirectly by interposing the
economic deterrent of increased cost. Nevertheless, because formal
quantitative restrictions present distinguishable problems of identification and removal, it is convenient to consider them separately.
The principal types of formal quantitative restrictions are
quotas and embargoes, the latter in effect being quotas which are
set at a level of zero import units. 28 They may be imposed either
28

It is apparent that a tariff can itself have the effect of an embargo if the rate is
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on a single product or on a group of related products. Quotas may
apply to all such imports collectively, regardless of origin, in
which case they are generally termed "global," or they may allocate
a specific quantity or proportion of the total quota to each country
of origin. In the l~tter case, a common criterion of allocation is
the amount supplied by each such country during a prior base
period. The maximum number of units to be permitted entry
under a quota may be absolute, in the sense that this figure may
not be exceeded during the quota period. In some instances, however, such as the current German quota on coal, imports are permitted above the quota maximum but are subjected to a higher
rate of duty which is frequently designed to render them noncompetitive in the importing market. This form of restriction is generally termed a "tariff quota."
Quota levels may be established by a variety of methods. The
simplest procedure is to specify the maximum number of units
that will be permitted entry under the quota during a fixed
period. Some quotas utilize more complicated formulae based on
the level of domestic demand, anticipated domestic production, or
various other criteria.29
Following World War II, most industrialized nations except
the United States employed quotas in conjunction with import
licensing controls, exchange restrictions, and other techniques, as
a means of conserving scarce foreign exchange during the period
of reconstruction. As their domestic economies developed, these
controls have been gradually relaxed. They remain prevalent,
however, in the less developed countries.

2. Mixing and Tying Requirements
Mixing requirements specify that not less than a designated
proportion of the components of processed goods must be of
sufficiently high. See, e.g., data supplied by the Sulphur Export Corporation with respect
to sulphur tariffs in Mexico and certain other foreign countries, which it characterized
as "so high as to represent a complete embargo." Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2,
at 1841.
29 The United States quota on petroleum imports illustrates the potential complexity
of these formulae. The United States is divided for quota purposes into five districts
(Puerto Rico constitutes an additional district) and petroleum imports are divided into
three categories-crude and unfinished oils, finished petroleum products, and residual
fuel oil for use as fuel. The maximum level of imports of each category of products in
each district is determined by various interrelated formulae based on a composite of
domestic demand, the level of imports during various prior base years, and the proportion
of total imports supplied by various categories and subcategories of these products. The
allocation of import licenses among importers is determined by a related set of formulae.
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domestic origin. While such requirements characteristically apply
to agricultural products (for example, the requirement that bread
processed in the importing country must contain at least a specified proportion of domestic wheat fl.our), they are capable of being
applied to certain types of non-agricultural commodities.
Tying requirements condition the importation of a commodity
upon a commitment by the importer (or the foreign supplier or
exporter) to provide a market for a specified quantity of another
commodity which the importing country wishes to sell. In the
typical case, the tied commodity is one that has not been moving
successfully in ordinary trade. Usually, although not always, the
commitment must be to sell in the export market. Tying requirements are characteristically found among the less developed nations, such as those of Latin America.
Both of these forms of restriction can seriously inhibit imports.
Mixing requirements may be c9mpared with quotas based on a
proportion of domestic production. Tying requirements can be
even more restrictive. Since the tied commodity is likely to be difficult to sell profitably, and since its market may not be familiar
to the party required to give the commitment, the effect may be
to discourage the transaction altogether.

3. Import Licensing Controls
One of the most flexible and effective methods of restricting
international trade is to require that imports be licensed in advance by the government of the importing country. It is apparent
that by making licenses easier or more difficult to obtain, the government can regulate the volume of imports of any commodity
at will.30 It is also apparent that the regulation can be accomplished either by establishing formal criteria governing the issuance of licenses or--often more simply and effectively-by causing
issuance to depend on ad hoc administrative determinations.
Licensing requirements today are most prevalent in the less
developed countries, where they are frequently coupled with
exchange controls. 31 Together, they often comprise a more serious
80 Import licensing controls are thus effective substitutes for formal quotas or
embargoes, and may be less readily identifiable. The Sulphur Export Corporation has
asserted that "one of the most flagrant examples of nontariff discrimination is the
current policy of the Japanese Government of absolutely prohibiting any imports of
crude elemental sulphur by refusing to issue import licenses." Hearings on H.R. 9900,
supra note 2, at 1842. The Japanese appear to have relaxed these restrictions somewhat
in recent months.
81 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, op. cit. supra note 19, at 157.
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deterrent to imports than any other restrictions imposed by those
oountries.82 Even among the industrialized nations, however, some
licensing requirements still remain. The Commission of the European Economic Community has recently stated:
"The elimination of quantitative restrictions has not necessarily dispensed importers and exporters from the obligation
of obtaining licenses. The administrative procedure for issuing these is often extremely cumbersome, involving prolonged
delays or even genuine impediments especially in cases of economic hardship or sensitive products. Hence, even where licenses
are issued automatically, the licensing system is not in practice
always compatible with the free movement of goods in the
Common Market and should therefore be abolished." 88
Licensing controls are frequently used, either in addition to
or in lieu of exchange controls, as a method of alleviating international payments deficits. Another common purpose, at least in
the less developed countries, is to encourage the growth of domestic industries. In Mexico, for example, the original objective of
licensing controls was primarily to conserve foreign exchange for
essential uses. The system now increasingly appears to be administered as a means of protecting local industries. Two of the principal criteria for evaluating a license application are whether
domestic sources of supply are adequate and whether the proposed
import transaction would adversely affect competition in the domestic market. 84
4. Exchange Controls
Since international trade depends upon the adequate availability of foreign exchange on reasonable terms, the manner in
which exchange controls are applied can sharply affect the volume
of imports. There are many forms of such controls, including
general restrictions on current payments, multiple currency prac82 "[M]ost free trade advocates recognize that in many areas, such as Latin America,
the chief barrier to increased trade is not high tariffs, but complex and discriminatory
non-tariff import and exchange control regulations." Id. at 255.
88 Memorandum of the Commission, supra note 14, at 14.
84 Import licensing controls in many countries are even more directly designed to
protect domestic industries. As an example, a license is required in Venezuela to import
any commodity of a kind produced by a local industry which the government desires to
encourage. Normally, licenses for such commodities will be issued only to the extent
that the domestic demand may be expected to exceed domestic supply. It is indicative of
the underlying purpose of the restrictions that license applications are typically made not
to officials concerned with foreign trade but rather to the Ministry of Development.
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tices, preferential regional treatment, and bilateral payments
arrangements.
The improvement in the payments and reserves position of the
industrialized countries of Western Europe has led to a general
relaxation of their exchange controls. A similar trend has been
evident in Japan, although that country incurred a marked payments deficit in 1961 which was not reversed until early in 1962.
Controls remain common in the less developed nations, many of
which have substantial and continuing payments deficits as well
as serious internal economic problems.35
Practices common throughout Latin America illustrate the
exchange control difficulties faced by importers located in less
developed regions who seek to do business with United States
firms. Bilateral payments arrangements among Latin American
countries, although less prevalent than in the past, are still encountered. Member countries of the Latin American Free Trade
Association frequently accord reciprocal exchange control preferences which are not available to imports from other sources.
Moreover, multiple exchange rates exist in many countries.36

5. Prior Deposits
In a number of countries, importers are required to deposit
with the government a specified sum in order to obtain the license
or certificate of exchange cover which · is a precondition of the
import transaction. The deposit requirement may thus be viewed
as one element either of the country's exchange controls or of its
licensing controls. In its effect, however, it constitutes an additional
and frequently substantial obstacle to the transaction.
The extent to which this requirement may inhibit trade depends upon both the amount and the period of the deposit. The
amount is usually proportionate to the value of the proposed
85 For a recent review of exchange restrictions by country, see INT'L MONETARY FuND
14TH ANN, REP. ON EXCHANGE REsnuCTIONS pt. 2 (1963).
86 In Brazil, for example, two foreign exchange categories are used. Commodities
considered essential, and virtually all commodities from the other members of the Latin
American Free Trade Association, are included in the "general category." All other
commodities appear in the "special category." Importers of articles in both categories
must contract in advance for foreign exchange, but importers of special category items
must also obtain an import license. For this purpose, it is first necessary to obtain a
"promise of license." These promises are made available at public auction by the Superintendency of Money and Credit. Because the amount of foreign exchange available for
special category imports is restricted by the government, the prices of promises to license
are ordinarily bid up to a level which effectively discourages the importation of these
items.
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import, the proportion often depending on the nature of the
commodity. Imports considered essential to the domestic economy
may be exempted from the deposit requirement, while luxury
goods may be subject to a deposit so prohibitive as to constitute a
virtual embargo.37
The period of the deposit is usually the same irrespective of
the nature of the commodity involved. It may represent a serious
deterrent to an importer who lacks sufficient financial resources
to permit him to tie up funds for this length of time. Moreover,
a long deposit period is an additional obstacle in countries where
inflation has caused high interest rates, thus materially increasing
the total cost of the import transaction. Conditions in Brazil,
where the cruzeiro has become drastically devalued and annual
interest rates are often in the range of thirty to forty percent, illustrate the extent to which domestic inflation may aggravate the
burden imposed by deposit requirements.

6. Formal Customs Provisions
In addition to the tariff schedules themselves, there are certain
formal provisions of the customs laws that may restrict imports.
Among the most important are procedural formalities and methods
of valuation. Customs formalities, if disproportionate to the
necessary processing of the transaction, theoretically can constitute
a substantial barrier to imports. It may be doubted, however,
whether this type of impediment (as contrasted, for example, with
delay in issuing import licenses, which appears to be a relatively
common and effective device in some countries) has in fact been
a major deterrent to trade in recent years. The various efforts
which are currently being made to reduce and standardize customs
formalities are primarily designed to simplify and facilitate import
transactions which would probably occur in any event.88
By contrast, the valuation provisions of the customs laws may
87 In Chile, for example, deposit requirements frequently amount to as much as
200% of the value of the proposed import, and in rare cases reach 10,000%. In Brazil, the
deposit amounts to 200% in the case of all special category imports and 100% to 200%
in the case of commodities in the general category. Certain commodities considered
essential to the Brazilian economy are exempted from deposit requirements.
88 Unnecessary customs formalities may, of course, be a considerable nuisance in
import transactions, and attempts to eliminate them are to be commended. The Com•
mission of the European Economic Community, for example, has taken cognizance of
"all the administrative checks carried out when frontiers are crossed" and has commented
that "for the efficient working of the Common Market and doing away with physical
frontier checks within a reasonable period, these administrative obstacles to trade must
also be abolished." Memorandum of the Commission, supra note 14, at 14.
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have a considerable influence on the volume of trade. In the
United States, for example, legislation was adopted in 1956 which
altered the basis of valuation in a number of respects. These
changes have been regarded as slightly reducing the extent of
protection afforded by the tariff schedules, although the tariffs
themselves remained unchanged. 39 Their' effect would have been
considerably greater if the new act had not specifically provided
that items subject to a reduction in duty of five percent or more
as a result of the new provisions would continue to be valued
under the old act. The Treasury Department, having found that
the reduction would have amounted to as much as thirty or forty
percent in the case of some commodity groups, thereupon issued
a "final list" of articles for which the prior methods of valuation
were to be maintained.40
Another example of the manner in which customs valuation
provisions may affect international trade is afforded by the current
controversy over "American selling price." Under both the Tariff
Act of 1930 and the Customs Simplification Act of 1956, certain
commodities have been valued for duty purposes on the basis of
the United States price of the comparable commodity produced in
this country.41 The effect of this method of valuation is to increase
substantially the dutiable value of many commodities to which it
so The valuation provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 were originally contained in
§ 402, 46 Stat. 708 (1930). The Customs Simplification Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1401a (1958), redesignated § 402 as § 402a and enacted a new § 402 containing the

revised basis of valuation. Briefly, the 1956 act eliminated "foreign value" as the
principal basis of valuation and adopted "export value" in its stead. "United States
value" and "constructed value" (formerly "cost of production") were continued as
alternative bases of valuation, subject to certain modifications. "American selling price"
was also retained, similarly modified, in the case of certain classes of commodities.
As noted in the te.xt, the application of these changes was subject to the Treasury
Department's designation of articles to be included in the "final list" required by § 6(a)
of the 1956 act, for which the prior ,methods of valuation were to be continued. The
final list is reprinted in BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, EXPORTING TO THE UNITED
STATFS 70 (Dec. 1962). For a general discussion of the changes introduced by the 1956 act,
see id. at 14-17.
40 Although the final list was necessary in 1956 to prevent the change in valuation
methods from producing unintended alterations in the dutiable value of a number of
commodities, its continuance to the present time has been criticized by commentators.
See, e.g., MAssoN & ,VHITELY, BARRIERS TO TRADE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
27-30 (1960). The authors state that "Congress was so impressed with the protective effects
of the old valuation procedures that in enacting the change it provided for certain
commodities to be e.xempted from the new definitions .•.. For the time being, then, the
United States is operating on a dual valuation system, with old, more ambiguous and more
protective standards applicable to one group of commodities, and a modernized set of
standards applicable to all other dutiable imports." Id. at 29.
41 For the definition of American selling price, see the Tariff Act of 1930, § 402(e),
46 Stat. 708, 19 U.S.C. § 1402(e) (1958), as amended by the Customs Simplification Act
of 1956, 70 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. § 1401a (1958).
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applies. Since coal tar products are primarily affected, the provision
has been extensively criticized by foreign chemical firms. It has
been defended with equal vigor, however, by the United States
chemical industry.42

7. Customs Levies Other Than Normal Tariffs
Tariffs are by no means the only customs charges applicable to
imported commodities. In many foreign countries additional levies
exist. They are most frequently referred to as surcharges, import
taxes, or supplementary taxes, although other terms are occasionally used. Although they are prevalent in the less developed
countries, many industrialized nations also employ them.43
A similar form of customs levy, particularly common in the less
developed countries, is the luxury tax. Despite its name, this tax
is frequently applied not only to luxuries (which the importing
country presumably does not produce but feels it can do without)
but also to commodities which the country does produce and
which it wishes to insulate from foreign competition. The luxury
tax is often imposed in addition to both the tariff and the surcharge.
The cumulative effect of these levies can be formidable. In
Chile, for example, there exists a normal ad valorem or specific
tariff, an "additional tax" which is typically thirty percent of the
42 For a recent statement of the position of foreign chemical manufacturers, see
Chem. & Eng'r News, Oct. 28, 1963, p. 26, reporting the attitude of the German Verband
der Chemischen Industrie. The association strongly objects to the continuation of the
American selling price provision and urges that the matter be considered at the 1964
negotiations pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. To the same
effect is a recent speech by Dr. Victor M. Umbricht, President of CIBA North American,
at a Briefing Conference on Tariffs and Other Barriers to European-American Trade,
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8-9, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Briefing Conference]. Dr. Umbricht
maintains that the use of American selling price as a basis of valuation may raise the
effective rate of duty to as much as two or three times the level that would otherwise
e.xist.
The position of the United States chemical industry in support of the American selling
price method of valuation is conveniently summarized in SYNTHETIC ORGANIC CHEM. MFRS.
Ass'N OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CASE FOR AMERICAN SELLING PRICE (Nov. 1963).
43 For examples, see Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2; Hearings on H.R. 11970,
supra note 17. Many of these examples are found in the industrialized countries,
particularly in Western Europe. The United States industry has recently protested an
Italian "import equalization tax" on television receivers which is asserted to raise total
customs charges from 20% (the normal duty) to over 31%. See J. Commerce, June 18, 1963.
It may be noted that prior to the recent adoption of revised tariff schedules pursuant
to the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 72, 19 U.S.C. § 168 (Supp. IV, 1963) the
United States imposed certain import taxes under the INTERNAL REvENuE ConE OF 1954.
These have been incorporated in the revised tariff schedules in the form of specific duties,
and the corresponding sections of the Code repealed.
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duty-paid value, a luxury tax of thirty-two percent on luxury
items, and a temporary surcharge of up to 200 percent. Articles
subject to all or most of these charges face a major import barrier.44
In some instances, surcharges have been adopted for the purpose of alleviating a payments deficit rather than protecting domestic industries. This is true of the temporary Chilean surcharge
referred to above. The recent action by Canada provides another
illustration of the use of this technique. In mid-1962, the Canadian
Government, concerned over the nation's international payments
situation, imposed temporary import surcharges ranging from five
to fifteen percent.45 As the Canadian payments position subsequently improved, these charges were withdrawn.
In addition to the foregoing levies, it is normal for countries
to impose various customs fees. In theory, and usually in practice,
these fees are solely for the purpose of recouping expenses incurred in processing the import transaction. They are, therefore, too
minor to deter trade. In a few instances, however, they have been
set at levels disproportionate to the expense involved, with the
effect of creating an additional import barrier.
Finally, it should be noted that ordinary tariffs may be imposed
in a manner that creates restrictions in addition to those inherent
in tariff schedules of general applicability. Preferences created by
.customs unions and free trade areas provide an illustration. The
Commonwealth preference system constitutes a somewhat comparable case. Canada, for example, maintains a three-column tariff
schedule, consisting of a Commonwealth preference rate, a mostfavored-nation rate, and a general rate which is of slight significance today. The Commonwealth preference rate on many items
is appreciably lower than the most-favored-nation rate. As in the
case of regional trading arrangements, the result of the Commonwealth preference is to accord a competitive advantage to favored
suppliers at the expense of outsiders.
44 Chile is by no means an isolated case. A measure of the magnitude of the barrier
that can be presented by these additional duties is afforded by the customs treatment
of imports in Argentina. A new, unified tariff schedule has recently been adopted which
largely retains the restrictive character of the previous system of cumulative levies. Under
the new schedule, duties range up to 320% of C.I.F. value. The former supplementary
surcharge of 5% continues to be imposed on most items as a temporary measure (it is
scheduled to be terminated on Oct. I, 1964).
45 For detail, and a copy of the Order in Council adopting the surcharges, see
Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 17, at 1768-1834. The Canadian action required a
waiver under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was subsequently
obtained.
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8. Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements
One further type of formal governmental restriction on imports
requires brief mention. Unlike the controls discussed above, it
consists of multilateral rather than unilateral governmental action.
Although the mechanics of these intergovernmental agreements
differ, each of them is designed to regulate the availability in international trade of the commodity to which it relates.
Insofar as the underlying motivation is concerned, there are
two distinct categories of commodity agreements: those in which
the principal objective is to assist producers and the producing
countries, and those in which the objective is to protect competing
domestic industries within the consuming countries. Agreements
such as those relating to tin, wheat, sugar, and coffee are detailed
documents which provide elaborate procedures intended to assure
the producers of these commodities that they will receive adequate
and relatively stable prices in world markets. 46 By contrast, the
current textile agreement is designed to restrict cotton textile imports into the United States for the protection of the domestic
textile industry. 47
Intergovernmental commodity agreements of the former type
tend to reflect in general the interests of the principal parties. Producing countries approve them because of the benefits to their
domestic economies. Consuming countries are motivated by a
variety of considerations, not the least of which is a desire to increase the economic and political stability of the producing countries. Agreements of the second type, however, are beneficial
principally to competing industries within the consuming countries. Such agreements are accepted by the producing countries
largely because they foresee that refusal to do so is likely to cause
the consuming countries to impose unilateral controls which might
be both more restrictive and less amenable to subsequent modification than the terms of the agreement.
46 See, e.g., International Wheat Agreement 1959, T.I.A.S. No. 4302; International
Sugar Agreement 1959, T.I.A.S. No. 4389.
47 The Long Term Arrangement Regarding Trade in Cotton Textiles was concluded
at Geneva on Feb. 9, 1962. By the beginning of 1963, it had been accepted by 22
countries. It followed an interim arrangement for the same purpose which became
effective Oct. 1, 1961 for a one-year period. The Long Term Arrangement is implemented
in the United States by Exec. Order No. 11052, 27 Fed. Reg. 9691 (1962), which delegated
to the President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee the responsibility for supervising
the administration of the Arrangement and for negotiating the bilateral agreements
contemplated thereby. For a summary of the role of the Contracting Parties to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in concluding the Arrangement, see, e.g.,
PRESIDENT'S 6TH ANN. REP. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 9, 72 (1962); PRESIDENT'S
7TH ANN. REP., op. cit. supra note 21, at 7.
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For these reasons, agreements of the second type have been
criticized on the ground that they are the equivalent of unilaterally
imposed quotas, but are more objectionable because they are not
subject to the limitations provided in existing trade agreements
legislation.48 Nevertheless, a number of industries in the United
States have urged that such arrangements be concluded to protect
their interests. 40 Similar suggestions have been made by the European Economic Community50 and the European Coal and Steel
Community.51

B. Administrative Restrictions on the Entry of Goods
Each of the formal restrictions referred to above must necessarily be effectuated through administrative procedures. These
procedures afford opportunities for imposing restrictions on imports in addition to those inherent in the formal controls. Certain
examples, such as the use of licensing or exchange controls to
exclude imports of commodities produced domestically, have been
suggested in the previous discussion.
The potentially restrictive effects of administrative procedures
may be illustrated by reference to customs classification and valuation.112 In general, it may be said that the opportunity to create
administrative barriers to trade is implicit in every aspect of the
48 For an example of such criticism, see Separate Views of the Republicans on H.R.
11970, H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1962).
49 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 17, at 1767, 1838 (softwood lumber).
The Administration has indicated a willingness to discuss softwood lumber imports with
the Canadian Government. Id. at 1835. See also Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2, at
1842 (sulphur).
110 Memorandum of the Commission, supra note 14, at 75. The Commission states
that "in order to establish a common point of view for the Community, the Commission
took an active part in the negotiations for the cotton textile arrangement and, if the
arrangement works satisfactorily in practice, intends to propose that the same method be
used for other products."
111 The Council of Ministers of the ECSC is considering action to protect steel pro•
ducers within the Community from the increasing volume of steel imports. One possible
long-term solution reported to be under consideration is an intergovernmental commodity
agreement for steel. Wall Street J., Nov. 4, 1963, p. 2, col. 3.
112 See the classic comment of B. A. Levett: "Let me write the Administrative Act and
I care not who fixes the rates of duty." LEvErr, THROUGH THE CUSTOMS MAZE 11 (1923).
Recent commentators on trade between the United States and Canada have stated: "It
is no exaggeration to say that valuation and classification practices alone could easily be
manipulated to exclude almost any dutiable import from the United States or Canada."
MASSON &: ENGLISH, INVISIBLE TRADE BARRIERS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1
(1963). PROCEEDINGS, op. cit. supra note 19, calls attention to the significance of the
classification of proposed imports as "essential" or "non-essential" in some Latin American
countries and notes that "a change in classification from essential to non-essential can be
ruinous to an exporter who has developed the market and established a working distribution system." Id. at 260. ·while these classifications are often made within the framework
of statute or regulation, they -may nonetheless represent the exercise of ad hoc adminis•
trative discretion with respect to specific cases.
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classification and valuation provisions which entail the exercise
of discretion. There are many such instances in the customs laws
of every country.
The significance of classification procedures is reflected in the
fact that the recent promulgation of the revised tariff schedules
of the United States was preceded by a series of hearings intended
to ensure that the adoption of the new classification would not
alter applicable rates of duty. 53 A few of the more significant problems relating to classification may be summarized for illustrative
purposes.
Composition: Many tariff classifications depend upon whether
the article in question is "wholly," "in chief part," or "in part"
composed of certain materials. The difference in the possible rates
of duty may be substantial. When the article contains a number
of different components, the proportions of which may differ
depending upon whether they are based on value, weight, volume
or some other unit of measure, classification may entail considerable administrative discretion. When the unit of measure is value,
fluctuations in the prices of the components may further complicate the determination.
Component parts: This is a different problem from that of
determining the composition of an article. Many items are subject
to different rates of duty depending upon whether they are classified as component parts or as separate items. Experienced
exporters are accustomed to ship composite articles either assembled or in their separate components, according to which procedure results in the lower total duty.
End use: In a number of countries, the ultimate use of the
article may be an important factor in establishing its classification
for duty purposes. One common criterion is whether the article
is intended to become a component in domestic manufacture. If
so, the applicable duty is often substantially reduced. The uncertainty of distinguishing between identical imports on the basis of
their eventual use is apparent. 54
Origin: This is an important criterion of classification in the
tariff schedules of most countries. It is necessary to determine
whether most-favored-nation or Commonwealth preference rates
58 The revision does not appear to have altered significantly the average level of duties,
although some individual items have been affected. It resulted in sufficient changes,
however, to require the United States to enter into negotiations with other countries to
provide compensatory concessions in some instances.
54 One objective of the recent tariff revision in the United States was to eliminate,
insofar as possible, the reference to ultimate use as a criterion of classification.
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apply. Determination of origin may present difficulties when
the article contains components from different sources or when it
has been produced or processed in more than one country. In
certain countries, for example, an article cannot qualify for preferential tariff treatment under the country-of-origin provisions
unless it has been shipped directly to the port of entry.
Valuation, like classification, frequently entails the exercise of
administrative discretion. Under United States law, for example,
the determination of export value, United States value, or constructed value requires a decision as to what constitutes "such or
similar merchandise" to be used as the basis for valuing the
imported article. 55 Furthermore, customs officials must decide
whether the preferred basis of valuation can be "determined satisfactorily" in order to establish which basis to apply. 56 Various
additional decisions must be made, such as whether the merchandise to be used as the basis for valuation is "freely sold or, in the
absence of sales, offered for sale," whether it is sold or offered "to
all purchasers at wholesale" or, if to selected purchasers, whether
"in the ordinary course of trade ... at a price which fairly reflects
the market value of the merchandise," and whether it is sold or
offered in "the usual wholesale quantities."57 When constructed
value is used, numerous accounting determinations must be made.
These examples serve to indicate the extent to which the
classification and valuation provisions of the customs laws of any
country entail the exercise of administrative discretion.58 It is not
suggested that in the great majority of instances this discretion
is exercised in other than a conscientious and equitable fashion.
Nevertheless, the provisions afford a continuing opportunity to
impose additional restrictions against imported articles, either
deliberately or by inadvertence. In such circumstances, the diffi1111 See Customs Simplification Act of 1956, §§ 402(b)-(d), 70 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 140la(b)-(d) (1958).
56 Customs Simplification Act of 1956, § 402(a), 70 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. § 140la(a) (1958).
117 Customs Simplification Act of 1956, §§ 402(b)-(d), (f), 70 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 140la(b)-(d), (f) (1958). The same problems are involved in determining American selling
price under § 402(e).
118 A useful discussion of these administrative techniques and other forms of trade
barriers as employed in the United States and Canada is contained in MAssoN &: ENGLISH,
op. cit. supra note 52; MAssoN &: WHITELY, op. cit. supra note 40; and SOUTHWORTH &:
BUCHANAN, CHANGES IN TRADE RESnucrroNS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
(1960). For additional information on administrative techniques in Canada, see relevant
portions of ARTHUR ANDERSEN &: Co., TAX AND TRADE GUIDE: CANADA (1963); CANADIAN
IMPERIAL BOARD OF COMMERCE, DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA (1961). Administrative barriers
in the customs laws of the United States are discussed in HUMPHREY, AMERICAN IMPORTS
188-207 (1955).
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culty of detecting the discrimination contributes materially to its
effectiveness.

C. National Policies Underlying Restrictions on the Entry of
Goods
The preceding discussion has sought to illustrate the principal
non-tariff methods, both formal and administrative, by which
national governments may limit the entry of commodities in international trade. It has been suggested that these techniques should
be distinguished from the purposes motivating the restrictions.
This is necessary not only for conceptual clarity but also because
both law and diplomatic practice take cognizance of the purpose
as well as the method of restriction in assessing its propriety.
No useful purpose would be served by attempting to enumerate all of the possible reasons for which the importation of
goods may be controlled by governments. A wide range of political,
economic and other motivations are conceivable. As a background
for the consideration of legal remedies, however, it is desirable
to summarize the principal purposes for which restrictions are
most commonly imposed.
I. Protection of National Security
It is widely recognized that nations may regulate the importation of commodities that threaten their essential security interests. 59 The form of the domestic legal authority for such action
differs in different countries. In the United States, specific legislation for this purpose has been in effect since 1954.60 Its scope was
successively expanded in 1955 and 1958.61 It currently appears as
section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.62
See, e.g., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXl(b).
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1954, § 2, 68 Stat. 360; subsequently Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1955, § 7, 69 Stat. 166; and Trade Agreements Extension Act
of 1958, § 8, 72 Stat. 678.
61 In its original form, the national security provision was quite limited. It merely
provided that "no action shall be taken pursuant to [the Trade Agreements Act] to
decrease the duty on any article if the President finds that such reduction would threaten
domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements." Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1954, § 2, 68 Stat. 360.
In 1955, this authority was substantially extended by directing the President to "take
such action as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article to a level that will
not threaten to impair the national security." Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955,
§ 7, 69 Stat. 166. A procedure was provided by which the question was to be investigated
by the Office of Defense Mobilization and recommendations made to the President.
The 1958 amendment sought to clarify the criteria to be considered by the executive
branch in evaluating the effect of imports on the national security. It also introduced
59
60
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Section 232 prohibits the granting of a trade concession on
imports of any article when the President finds that the concession
would threaten to impair the national security. It establishes a
procedure for investigating the national security implications of
imports of any article and directs the President, unless he concludes that a threat to the national security does not exist, to
"take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to
adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such
imports will not so threaten to impair the national security." 63
Various investigative criteria are enumerated in the act, including
domestic production necessary for defense purposes, the current
and anticipated capacity of the domestic economy to meet such
requirements, and the effect of imports on the foregoing. 64
The executive branch has recognized that such restrictions
may be required in certain instances.65 Nevertheless, although
various changes in language which were viewed as rendering the provision more protective. See, e.g., the requirement that the President, on receipt of an affirmative finding
from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, must take restrictive action "unless"
he found that imports "do not" threaten the national security. The 1955 act had directed
such action only "if" he found such a threat. For discussion of the implications of this
change, see S. REP. No. 1838, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1958). Representative Mills took the
view that the amendment did not materially alter the effect of the national security
provision, since final determination remained with the President. See 104 CoNG. REC.
16542 (Aug. 7, 1958).
A number of additional changes were adopted in 1958 which provoked controversy,
both in and out of Congress, as to the proper objectives of the national security provision. It was widely agreed that, within reasonable limits, domestic industries directly
essential to the national defense are legitimate and necessary subjects of protection. But
the attempt to determine the point at which the economic condition of an individual
industry is related to the welfare of the domestic economy as a whole, and the extent to
which either consideration falls properly within the ambit of the national security provisions, engendered strongly divergent views. In this connection, the House Ways and
Means Committee stated:
"Your Committee was guided by the view that the national security amendment is
not an alternative to the means afforded by the escape clause for providing industries
which believe themselves injured a second court in which to seek relief. Its purpose
is a different one.... Serious injury to a particular industry, which is the principal
consideration in the escape-clause procedure, may also be a consideration bearing
on the national security position in particular cases, but the avoidance or remedy
of injury to industries is not the object per se." H.R. REP. No. 1761, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1958).
62 76 Stat. 877, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (Supp. IV, 1963). Section 232 is substantively identical
with § 8 of the 1958 act. H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1962). The
administration had originally proposed a procedural change, of conjectural practical
significance, by which the President would himself conduct the requisite investigation.
This proposal was deleted from the act as subsequently adopted.
63 Section 232(b), 76 Stat. 877, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (Supp. IV, 1963).
64 Section 232(c), 76 Stat. 877, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).
61:i See, e.g., testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric:
"I would want to see certain safeguards. That is why I refer to the importance of
section 232. We must always have in mind the importance of maintaining our own
"I think interdependence is important, but I always want to have, right here at
defense industry in this country.
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nearly forty applications have been filed for relief under the national security provision, affirmative action has been taken only
in the case of petroleum imports. These restrictions, in the form
of import quotas, were imposed March IO, 1959,66 and continue
in effect today. 67 They follow a series of investigations and recommendations by various governmental bodies and a program of
voluntary restrictions which was in effect during 1958.68

2. Relief of Injury Caused by Trade Concessions
A second widely recognized ground for restricting imports is
to relieve injury to a domestic industry resulting from trade concessions previously granted. In an attempt to ensure that controls
of this nature will be invoked only in appropriate instances, nations have sought to define in general terms the criteria justifying
their use. 69 In the United States, this "escape clause" procedure70
has been embodied in legislation since 1951.71 Successive amendments, generally designed to facilitate the obtaining of relief, culminated in the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958.72 The
1962 act contains further revisions, 73 the net effect of which is
probably to make relief somewhat more difficult to obtain.
Only a relatively small proportion of applications for relief
under the escape clause have been successful. During the period
from 1948 to 1962, prior to the passage of the Trade Expansion
home, an industrial base which we can look to for our support of our Military
Establishment.
"I do not think the two are inconsistent. I think they are supplementary."
Hearings on H.R. 9900 Before the House Committee on Ways and .Means, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 762 (1962).
66 Presidential Proclamation No. 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 (1959). The proclamation
has been modified by a succession of subsequent directives.
67 For a simplified summary of the mechanics of the quota, see note 29 supra.
68 A history of these controls and a description of their present operation is contained
in a speech by J. Cordell Moore, Administrator, Oil Import Administration, Department
of the Interior, at Briefing Conference.
69 See the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XIX.
70 Technically, escape clause relief has been redesignated "tariff adjustment" under
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The old term is so well entrenched by usage, however,
that it will probably continue to be employed. In the present discussion, use of the older
term is to be taken as referring to the procedure under either the 1962 or earlier acts, as
the context indicates.
71 See Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 73. Prior to 1951, the
President by executive order had specified the procedures by which the Tariff Commission was to administer the escape clause.
'12 72 Stat. 675 (1958).
73 As noted above, the escape clause appears in the 1962 act under the title of tariff
adjustment. The mechanism by which tariff adjustment operates is distributed through
§§ 301, 302, and 351 of the act. The substantive criteria by which the Tariff Commission
is to evaluate an application for relief appear in § 30l(b).
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Act, 135 applications were filed with the Tariff Commission. Of
these, thirty-two were subsequently dismissed or withdrawn. In the
remaining 103 cases, the Tariff Commission found no injury in
fifty-eight. Relief was denied by the President in twenty-six cases
and granted in fifteen. Four were still pending at the beginning
of 1963, in all of which the Commission has subsequently found
no injury under the criteria established by the 1962 act. 74

3. Prevention of Unfair Competitive Practices
A number of international trading practices have generally
been regarded as forms of unfair competition. Insofar as these practices are relevant to a discussion of import restrictions, they include
the sale of goods in the import market at prices below those obtained in the home market,75 patent, copyright or trademark
infringement by imported goods, failure to identify the country
of origin, use of convict or forced labor in the manufacture of
imported goods, and similar techniques. While there is general
agreement that these practices are objectionable and may properly
be prevented,76 they nevertheless afford occasional opportunities
for restricting imports which may not in fact compete unfairly
with domestic goods.
In the United States, the most general provision relating to
unfair import competition is section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended. 77 It prohibits "unfair methods of competition and
unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States"
where the "effect or tendency ... is to destroy or substantially
injure" a domestic industry or to restrain or monopolize United
States commerce. Final decision is made by the President following
an investigation by the Tariff Commission, the remedy for viola74 Data are taken from MASSON & ENGLISH, op. cit. supra note 52, at 29.
711 Probably tbe most comprehensive discussion of tbis practice, known as "dumping,"
is contained in VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923). Most
countries accord relief where dumping results in injury to a domestic industry. It has
occasionally been suggested, however, tbat tbe practice is objectionable only when
accompanied by a predatory intent. By contrast, tbe Secretariat of tbe European Free
Trade Association suggests tbat, although dumping is classified by tbe Stockholm Convention as a rule of competition, "it is legitimate to regard it as more like an escape
clause tban as part of a code of behavior." See SECRETARIAT OF THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE
Ass'N, STOCKHOLM CONVENTION EXAMINED 42 Gan, 1963).
76 See, e.g., tbe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. VI, XX(d)•(e).
Comparable provisions are found in international conventions establishing tbe various
regional trading arrangements among nations.
77 46 Stat. 703, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958). The predecessor of § 337 is § 316
of tbe Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 943.
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tion being denial of entry. Most of the proceedings brought under
this provision have involved patent or trademark infringement. 78
Imports of patented, trademarked or copyrighted articles can
also be hindered by the absence or inadequate enforcement of
laws designed to prevent infringement within the importing country. During hearings on the Trade Expansion Act, Senator Javits
proposed an amendment (which was not adopted) which would
have specified that "infringements of U.S. patents, copyrights, and
registered trademarks will be considered as actions unjustifiably
restricting U.S. commerce and as cause for retaliatory measures
by the United States." 79
Identification of marks of origin is enforced under section 304
of the Tariff Act of 1930.80 Although exceptions to marking requirements are permitted under specified circumstances, there
have been examples of the application of these requirements
which appear to have imposed an undue burden on importers. 81
Articles produced by convict or forced labor are prohibited
importation by section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.82 An exception is permitted in situations in which the domestic supply of
such articles is inadequate.
The sale of imported goods at prices below those prevailing
in the country of origin is prohibited in many countries by antidumping laws. 83 The numerous adjustments necessary to arrive
at a valid comparison between the price of an article in the importing market and in the home market will necessarily entail, in
complex cases, the frequent exercise of administrative discretion.
Particularly troublesome problems relate to the treatment of
quantity discounts in the importing market when the article is
not sold in comparable quantities in the home market84 and to the
78 It may be observed that the copyright laws severely curtail protection to works
published abroad and subsequently imported into this country. Copyright Act § 1, 61
Stat. 652 (1947), as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
79 Hearings on H.R. 11970 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d
..Sess. 1288 (1962). Senator Javits asserted that "infringements of U.S. patents and other
- rights have demonstrably interfered with our ability to export . . . ." Ibid.
so 46 Stat. 687, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1958). The Trade-Mark Act of 1946,
§§ 42, 43, 60 Stat. 440, 441, 15 U.S.C. §§ II24, ll25 (1958) prohibit marking which misrepresents the origin or nature of imported articles.
81 See, e.g., MAssoN & WHITELY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 33-34.
82 46 Stat. 689, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1958).
83 See generally the Antidumping Act of 1921, 42 Stat. ll-15 (1930), as amended, 19
U.S.C. §§ 160-69 (1958). Dumping laws in a number of other countries have roughly the
same effect, although they differ considerably as to procedure and in some instances as
to the criteria applied. In Canada, for example, the dumping duty is applied if the goods
are of a class or kind made in that country, without inquiry as to injury.
84 In Canada, an extra discount may not be allowed for valuation purposes where
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allocation of various selling expenses between the two markets.
Moreover, fluctuations in prices or rates of exchange during the
period under review can create additional complications.
When there are insufficient sales to permit valid price comparisons, administrative discretion is frequently required in determining costs of production, particularly where accounting methods
differ. In countries in which injury is a prerequisite to the imposition of dumping duties, difficult questions arise concerning the
identification of the relevant domestic industry (either geographically or in terms of product lines), the presence or absence of
predatory intent and its significance, the extent, if any, to which
the price of the imported article is less than the domestic price,
the volume of imports and their probable duration, the nature
and extent of the adverse effects on the domestic industry and
similar problems. 85

4. Protection of Public Health, Safety and Morals
Import regulations of this character are universally recognized
among nations. Their general purpose is unexceptionable. They
may relate to standards of identity, quality, and purity for foodstuffs, labelling of medicines and potentially harmful substances,
quarantine and inspection of plants and animals, registration or
exclusion of dangerous articles, and similar matters. These regulations are sanctioned by the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade86 and by regional trading arrangements among nations. 87
Controls of this type have, however, occasionally been employed
to impose additional administrative burdens on imports which
may not in fact constitute a threat to health, safety, or morals.
Attempts which have been made to simplify and harmonize such
restrictions reflect an awareness of this potential abuse of a legitimate regulatory power. 88
•
imported goods are sold in larger quantities than in the home market, whereas sales in
unusually small quantities will be credited with a smaller discount than exists in the
home market. See MAssoN &: ENGLISH, op. cit. supra note 52, at 12.
85 For a useful discussion, see background material for speech by James Pomeroy
Hendrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, at Briefing Conference. This
material also contains a summary of Treasury Department actions in antidumping
proceedings since the act was adopted in 1921.
86 Art. XX(a), (b).
87 See, e.g., Stockholm Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Ass'n arL
12; Montevideo Treaty Establishing the Latin American Free Trade Ass'n art. 53.
88 See Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Programme of the Community
for the Second Stage 15 (Oct. 24, 1962) urging harmonization of these provisions or in
some instances their codification in a single European body of regulations. See also art. 12
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5. Other Common Objectives of Restrictions on the Entry of
Goods
It has been suggested in connection with the previous reference
to exchange controls that the conservation of scarce foreign exchange is a frequent objective of import restrictions. Another
purpose that has been mentioned is the encouragement of domestic industries by insulating them from foreign competition.
Restrictions of both types are prevalent in, although not limited
to, the less developed nations. There is evidence that restrictions
in favor of domestic industries may be increasing in those areas. 89
D. Non-Tariff Import Barriers Other Than Restrictions on Entry
In addition to restrictions on entry, there exist a variety of
other techniques, both governmental and private, by which imports may be placed at a competitive disadvantage or excluded
altogether. Prospective exporters have frequently found these
methods to be at least as restrictive as those previously discussed.
They may be generally classified as discriminatory practices relating to government procurement, taxes (either national or local)
other than import levies, and programs of government subsidy.
In addition, import restrictions may result from private action.

I. Government Procurement Policies
It is common practice for governments to give preference to
domestic industries in the award of public contracts. In some inof the Stockholm Convention, providing that these restrictions as therein authorized
shall not be used "as a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
Member States or as a disguised restriction on trade between Member States••.•"
89 The PRESIDENT'S 7TH ANN. REP. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 10 (1963)
comments that "restrictions in less developed countries have become increasingly wide•
spread on imports for which substitutes are available from local production." For
examples from industrialized countries, see SOUTHWORTH & BucHANAN, op. cit. supra note
58, at 32, citing instances in which Canadian tariff classification depends on whether the
imported article is of a "class or kind made in Canada" (a lower duty being assessed if
it is not). See also testimony by William R. Hewlett with respect to H.R. 9900: "Most
of the equipment that we manufacture is classified by the United Kingdom as equipment
that may enter duty free if there is no comparable product in the United Kingdom. If,
however, such a product is available from local sources, then our product carries a
33¾ percent tariff." Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 65, at 2206.
The Commonwealth preference system constitutes a form of restriction in favor of
Commonwealth industry, both in manufacturing the final product and-through the
Commonwealth content requirements-in supplying the component parts. By allowing
preferential rates of duty only on articles of Commonwealth origin, and by specifying
that to qualify under this criterion the article must have not less than a prescribed
Commonwealth content, the preference system encourages Commonwealth manufacturers
t~ use local materials insofar as possible. See, e.g., Armstrong, How Canadian Exports
Can. Enjoy British Preference, INDUSTRIAL CANADA 47-51 (Sept. 1963).
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stances, this policy is embodied in legislation; in others, it results
from administrative action.90 Particularly in the case of industries
in which the government is a major customer, "buy national"
policies can greatly restrict purchases from foreign suppliers. The
Commission of the European Economic Community has recently
commented:
"Entrepreneurs and their products, in quite a number of
cases concerning the award of public contracts, still have to
contend with extra formalities if not actual discrimination
in other Member States. Since the public sector takes such
a large slice of the national product, these practices constitute no mean obstacle to freedom of trade." 91
Restrictive government purchasing policies have various motivations. They may result from the same desire to encourage the
development of domestic industry that was previously mentioned
in connection with restrictions on the entry of goods, or they may
be attributable to a concern for the country's international payments position.92 They may also reflect a desire to protect domestic
industries irrespective of their stage of development.93 Characteristically, these policies derive from a combination of motives.
It follows that restrictions on government procurement are not
confined to less developed countries. Indeed, their prevalence
90 Compare, for example, the operation of the Buy American Act, 47 Stat. 1520 (1933),
41 U.S.C. § IO(a)-(c) (1958), as implemented by Exec. Order No. 10582, 19 Fed. Reg. 8723
(1954) in the United States, with the informal administrative policy employed in
Canada. Both appear to constitute effective deterrents to imports in many industries.
(It should be noted that, for purposes of defense procurement, the United States has
waived the applicability of the Buy American Act under certain circumstances with
respect to specified articles.)
91 Memorandum of the Commission, supra note 88, at 15. For one listing of restrictive
government procurement practices in Western Europe and the United States, see testimony
of Seymour Graubard with respect to H.R. 9900, Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note
65, at 3590-92.
92 The United States Government has recently taken a renewed interest in the application of the Buy American Act, particularly in the field of defense procurement, because
of continued concern regarding the payments deficit. There is also a recent article in
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Sept. 24, 1963) announcing the decision of the Japanese Government "to institute a new policy to have Ministries and other governmental agencies give
priority to purchases of domestically-made products as part of its program to preserve
the nation's international payments balance." A special agency is to be established within
the Prime Minister's Office "to encourage the use of domestically-made products by
governmental organs."
98 See, for example, the announcement on July 26, 1962, of a governmental program
to aid the United States softwood lumber industry. The program includes "the establish•
ment of a preference for American products in the purchase of lumber by the Department
of Defense, the General Services Administration and other Federal departments and
agencies [which) could be particularly significant in connection with the various
aspects of the AID program." Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 79, at 1835.
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among industrialized nations constitutes an important obstacle to
the effectiveness of multilateral tariff reductions in expanding
the volume of international trade. An example of foreign purchasing restrictions is provided by the experience of the United States
electrical wire and cable industry. Official procurement policies
are particularly significant in that industry since foreign governments and government purchasing agencies frequently constitute
the principal customers for many types of wire and cable. The
industry has recently stated:
"[W]e have been refused permission to submit bids, or even
to obtain specifications, in the case of bids solicited by the
purchasing agents of a number of foreign governments. We
have also found that foreign governments make use of 'grandfather' clauses and similar techniques to preclude bids by
United States wire and cable companies. In addition, instances have occurred in which a foreign government has
sought the advice of the local wire and cable industry in
determining whether a United States company should be allowed to submit a bid to that government, and has accepted
the recommendation of its industry that the United States
company not be permitted to bid. In some instances, bid
requests from foreign government agencies require the bidder to show the percentage of proposed manufacture within
the territory of that government, and expressly state that consideration will be given to this information in evaluating
the bid." 94
As the foregoing quotation suggests, restrictive procurement
policies may be applied not only in the case of purchases made
directly by governments, but also in those situations in which
procurement is conducted through government purchasing organizations of various types. One of the problems faced by the United
States coal industry, for example, in seeking to develop an export
market in France, is the procurement policy of the Association
Technique !'Importation Charbonniere. The ATIC is a public
corporation which is the only authorized importer of coal from
sources outside the European Coal and Steel Community, and its
operations are subject to the coal import policies of .the French
Government. Sales to the United Kingdom are similarly discouraged by the purchasing policies of the National Coal Board.911
94 Statement of the Import Committee of the Wire and Cable Division of the
National Electrical Manufacturers Association Before the United States Tariff Commission (March 6, 1964).
95 A general discussion of barriers to United States coal exports is contained in
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Restrictive procurement practices are not limited to national
governments. In a number of countries, local governments impose
comparable barriers to imports either· from outside national
boundaries or, in some instances, from outside the local jurisdiction. An illustration of the latter form of restriction is afforded
by the recent Canadian controversy over "buy provincial" practices. One Canadian observer has remarked that "the growing
trend in Canada to give local suppliers and contractors special
preference when awarding government and even private business
contracts is producing what amounts to an internal 'tariff' structure... .'' 96

2. Taxes Other Than Import Levies
Internal taxes that apply equally to domestic and imported
articles are ordinarily not discriminatory per se, even though they
are based on duty-paid value in the case of an import. In such
instances, it is the duty, not the tax, that causes the absolute
amount of the tax to be higher on the imported than on the domestic product. 97 There are, however, internal taxes which, while
on their face nondiscriminatory, are in fact discriminatory because
ROBERT R. NATHAN AssocIATES, THE FOREIGN POTENTIAL FOR UNITED STATES CoAL, REP.
TO THE DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF COAL REsEARCH (1963) [hereinafter cited as
NATHAN REP.].
Financial Post (Oct. 19, 1963). The article cites the following as examples:
"Some local authorities are paying premiums of as much as lOo/o-15% to local
suppliers.
"Quebec has spelled out in some detail a policy of favoring Quebec manufacturers
and other business firms.
"Many other provinces are following similar policies, although they are frequently
less explicit in setting out the rules.
"Even municipalities in some areas make it difficult for outside suppliers to win
municipal contracts."
07 The fact that the tax, in absolute terms, is higher on the imported article may of
course adversely affect its competitive position. Where the imported article is priced
sufficiently below the comparable domestic article to enable it to reach a different price
market, the application of a relatively large internal tax to both articles may dispropor•
tionately injure the competitive position of the import by increasing its price to the
point where it cannot retain its former market. Such a tax would not, however, contravene art. III, para. 2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as interpreted by
its supplementary provisions.
It should be observed that whereas in the United States tax revenues derive principally
from income taxes, with state and local sales taxes generally at very low levels, the
revenues of European countries depend to a much greater extent on sales and similar
taxes. In a number of such countries, sales or turnover taxes may amount to 25%. Where
the amount of the tariff is appreciable, a sales tax of this magnitude applied to the
duty-paid value of the imported article may considerably increase its total cost. The
foregoing effect is magnified where more than one turnover tax is imposed. The Commission of the European Economic Community is studying means of abolishing the
so-called "cascade" tax on gross turnover, Memorandum of the Commission, supra note
88, at 25.
06
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of the manner of their incidence. Taxes of this nature may constitute serious deterrents to prospective exporters and importers.
The hearings on the Trade Expansion Act have publicized
one of the classic examples of discriminatory internal taxation.
This is the annual use or road tax which exists in some European
countries. France and Italy provide the best-known instances. In
neither case is the tax discriminatory in form, since its ostensible
objective is proper and it applies to all vehicles irrespective of
origin. The discrimination consists in the sharply disproportionate
increase in the levy on automobiles above a certain horsepower.
In France, for example, the tax on automobiles of low "fiscal
horsepower" is nominal, the annual rate on sixteen horsepower
being only thirty dollars. Above sixteen horsepower, however, the
rate on new automobiles begins at 203 dollars.98 The adverse effect
on imports of larger American cars is obvious.

3. Subsidy Programs and Price Controls
Virtually all governments provide economic assistance in some
degree to particular domestic industries. The forms that these
benefits can take are as numerous as the purposes for which they
may be provided. They include not only outright grants but also
various forms of tax benefits, preferential treatment in the administration of loan programs, administration of procurement and
stockpiling programs, minimum price regulations, and a wide
variety of other techniques.99 These benefits are relevant to the
present discussion to the extent that they may constitute a form of
discrimination against imported goods. In a sense, any subsidy
that assists a domestic industry can be so considered, since it
strengthens pro tanto the competitive position of the domestic
article relative to that of its imported counterpart. This is true
whether or not the subsidy is designed as a form of protection
against import competition. In Canada, for example, the subventions paid on the transportation of domestic coal have recently
been calculated to average more than five dollars per ton.100 This
is a considerably more significant obstacle to sales of United States
coal in Canada than the tariff of fifty cents per ton on bituminous
coal imports.
98 See statement of American Automobile Manufacturers Association, Hearings on

R.R. 9900, supra note 65, at 4089.
99 For an indication of the possible scope of subsidy programs, see JOINT ECONOMIC
COMM., 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUBSIDY AND SUBSIDYLIKE PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
(1960).
100 NATHAN REP. vol. I, ch. VII, at 4.
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Some types of benefits are specifically designed to assist domestic industries against foreign competition. In France, both the
wholesale and the retail price of coal imported from countries
outside the European Coal and Steel Community is regulated to
prevent it from underselling domestic coal.101 These controls effectively deprive United States coal of the price advantage it
would otherwise possess in the French market. A different form
of assistance is provided by the maritime subsidy program in the
United States. To protect the domestic shipbuilding industry, a
construction-differential subsidy is authorized under the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936102 to compensate for the difference between
domestic and foreign shipbuilding costs. To assist the ship operators, the act also authorizes an operating-differential subsidy103 to
compensate for higher operating costs. To qualify for these benefits, the United State operator must, inter alia, agree to use
domestic materials and supplies and to have his vessel repaired
in the United States. Both of these subsidies have the effect of
depriving foreign shipyards and materials suppliers of the price
advantages which they could otherwise offer in competing for
business in the United States.

4. Private Practices
In addition to the various restrictions resulting from governmental policies and programs, import barriers may result from
private action. A common instance is the preference of many
consumers for goods of national origin. This preference, which
is understandably encouraged by domestic suppliers,104 may range
from outright refusal to purchase foreign articles when the domestic counterpart is available, to the more common case in which
the consumer will buy domestically unless a significant price di£101 Id. ch. VI, at 22. The Report also notes that because of governmental price and
subsidization programs, "the price at which coal is marketed in France, whether of
imported or indigenous origin, does not reflect true cost relationships.'' Vol. III, annex
D, at 142.
The Report concludes that "subsidies are likely to be used increasingly as a means of
protecting indigenous coal production, which would negate the effect of reduced import
barriers. An approach to the problem that did not take this into account would be
futile.'' Vol. I, ch. X, at 24.
102 49 Stat. 1995-2001, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1151-61 (Supp. IV, 1963). See generally
SUBSIDY AND SUBSIDYLIKE PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 99, at
39-48.
103 49 Stat. 2001-08, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1171-82 (Supp. IV, 1963).
104 A typical example is the "Buy Canadian-Make Canadian-Sell Canadian"
promotion program conducted by the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. See INDUSTIUAL CANADA, op. cit. supra note 89, at 64.
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ferential or other advantage exists in favor of the foreign article.
The extent of this national preference obviously varies widely
among individual consumers. Since it is affected by the relationship between the consumer an& his domestic supplier, it tends to
be more prevalent in commercial transactions than among retail
customers.105
Cartel and other concerted business practices are probably the
most widely recognized instances of private action that may restrict the importation of goods. The European Economic Community and similar regional bodies have given considerable attention to these arrangements, lest they impair the progress being
made in reducing other forms of trade restraints. There is a
corresponding risk that such arrangements may tend to vitiate the
effects of tariff reductions.
The most familiar form of cartel restriction consists of an
international undertaking among suppliers not to sell in each
others' markets. The obligation may be absolute, or it may take
the form of an agreed quota or a requirement of prior concurrence
by suppliers located within the market in question. United States
firms which have sought to expand their export markets have
found that concerted practices among their foreign competitors
can also comprise a serious deterrent. Joint pricing and marketing
policies on the part of such competitors can make entry into their
market substantially more difficult. A potentially more serious
impediment is the occasional practice by which foreign suppliers,
acting in concert, designate their members in rotation to undersell
the imported article.
Ocean freight rates established by private international shipping conferences are also an important factor in international
trade. Not only is the level of rates significant in determining th!:!
profitability of export shipments, but disparities between rate
levels may benefit one group of exporters at the expense of another.
Considerable attention has recently been directed to differences
between eastbound and westbound rates on Atlantic crossings,
which are frequently to the disadvantage of United States exporters.106 Comparisons of freight rates charged for shipments
from the United States and from Europe to various Asian, African
105 Articles of foreign origin, such as British woolens or Italian shoes, are, of course,
frequently at a premium in the retail industries.
106 Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance of Payments, Hearings
Before the Joint Economic Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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and Latin American destinations have provided a more direct
measure of this competitive disadvantage.107

E. Effect of Non-Tariff Barriers on the Volume of International
Trade
It is hazardous to attempt any quantitative assessment of the
extent to which the foregoing restrictions may have reduced the
volume of international trade. Where they have resulted in an
embargo or a quota of known dimensions, a rough estimate of
their effect may be obtained by calculating the volume of trade
that would have occurred in the absence of such restrictions. Where
they are less readily identifiable and the extent of their application
is less certain, it becomes virtually impossible to arrive at any
reliable quantitative conclusion. There can be no doubt, however,
that their cumulative effect is substantial.1°8
As suggested at the outset of this discussion, the policy objectives of the United States and the continuing concern regarding the balance of payments deficit require that increased attention
be given to means of reducing foreign non-tariff import barriers.
107 Sec statement by Robert C. Clark, Vice-President, FMC International, id. at 307.
Mr. Clark reported that for seven chemical commodities studied, the average rate from
Europe to third country destinations was $1.54 per 100 lbs., as contrasted with $2.33 in
the case of shipments from the United States to the same destinations. Concern over the
rate disadvantage to which United States exporters are subject has prompted the
Administration to suggest that, unless the disparities can be removed by other means,
legislative remedy may be required. See President's Special Message on Balance of
Payments, 109 CONG. REc. 12113 (daily ed. July 18, 1963).
Shipowners have agreed that eastbound rates are often higher than westbound rates
and that rates from the United States to third countries may exceed those over comparable
distances from foreign ports. They maintain, however, that this circumstance results not
from discriminatory intent but rather from competitive factors. Among the latter they
cite higher stevedoring and port charges in the United States. They also assert that the
prevailing smaller volume of non-bulk dry cargoes in shipments to the United States
must be compensated by somewhat higher rates on comparable outbound shipments.
See, e.g., 37 !NT'L TRADE REv. 86 (1963).
108 MASSON &: WHITELY, BARRIERS TO TRADE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
65 (1960) comment that "these 'invisible' barriers are multitudinous, and make their
effects felt in a variety of ways." The authors attempt some general conclusions as to
the effects of United States import barriers on Canadian industrial raw materials and
fuels (id. at 72-76) and manufactured intermediate products and consumers' goods (id. at
76-82). The effects of Canadian barriers on selected categories of United States exports
are considered id. at 83-95.
The Nathan Report estimates that by 1970 United States coal exports could be
increased by as much as 250% over the 1962 level, "depending largely on the extent to
which the foreign nations relax their barriers to the entry of imported coal and other
protective measures for their coal industries." NATHAN REP. vol. I, ch. I, at I. The
Sulphur Export Corporation has noted that "the countries restricting imports from the
United States in one way or another account for 50 percent of the sulfur consumed
outside of the United States, but they take only 25 percent of our exports, whereas those
countries not restricting United States imports account for 75 percent of our exports."
Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 65, at 1843.
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Unless this can be done, the benefits which this country has hoped
to derive from its export expansion program and from the 1964
round of multilateral tariff negotiations are in danger of being
materially diminished. It is therefore relevant to · examine the
authority that exists for this purpose in the domestic law of the
United States, and to attempt to form an estimate of the extent
to which these remedial provisions may become effective instruments of national policy.

III.

THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN THE DOMESTIC LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES

Legislative provisions relating to non-tariff import restrictions
maintained by foreign nations are of two general types. The first
includes statutory authority to negotiate with other countries concerning the existence and removal of these barriers. It also includes
the administrative procedures established to bring them to the
attention of United States government officials, to process complaints by domestic firms which consider their export trade
adversely affected, and to conduct the negotiations intended. to
remove them. The second category comprises the substantive
authority to deal with such restrictions, either by offering inducements to their removal or by threatening retaliatory action.

A. Negotiating Authority and Procedures for Dealing with NonTariff Import Restrictions
I. Authority To Negotiate
The authority of the President to negotiate with foreign nations concerning non-tariff trade barriers has long been recognized
by statute.109 The Dingley Tariff Act of 1897 contained the first
explicit delegation of authority to enter into agreements for the
purpose of terminating discriminatory treatment of United States
exports. 110 Agreements concluded by the executive branch pur109 Because the statutory basis of the President's authority is clear, no consideration
is given to the constitutional question as to the extent of the authority that would exist
in the absence of legislative delegation. It should be recognized, however, that the inherent
authority of the President to conduct the actual negotiations with foreign nations is
beyond dispute. This power exists irrespective of delegation, since it derives directly from
the Constitution. As stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
319 (1936):
"In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of
the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it."
110 Section 3, 30 Stat. 203-04 (1897).
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suant to that act related to a variety of foreign restrictive devices
other than tariffs.111
This authority has been part of the trade agreements program
since its inception. Section 350(a)(l) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended, authorized the President
"For the purpose of expanding foreign markets for the
products of the United States ... whenever he finds as a fact
that any existing duties or other import restrictions ... are
unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the
United States ... to enter into foreign trade agreements with
foreign governments or instrumentalities thereof . . . ."112
The express statutory reference to non-tariff import restrictions was the deliberate consequence of congressional concern that
such obstacles might otherwise vitiate the benefits of tariff concessions obtained from foreign nations. During legislative hearings
on the Trade Agreements Act, much testimony had been presented
concerning the existence of these restrictions. Secretary of State
Cordell Hull, among others, stated that in view of their prevalence
and variety, the statute should provide explicit authority to
negotiate concerning them. 113 The House Ways and Means Committee, in its report on the bill, pointed out that it was specifically
drafted to include reference to import restrictions other than
tariffs. 114
The present statutory authority to enter into trade agreements
with foreign nations appears in section 20l(a) of the Trade Ex111 For examples, see Principal Legal Questions Raised Relating to H.R. 5550,
Office of the Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, Hearings on H.R. 5550 Before the House
Committee on JVays and Means, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-80 (1956). The memorandum
also cites instances of such agreements concluded prior to 1897 pursuant to the Tariff
Act of 1890, which sought to terminate "unequal and unreasonable treatment of American
exports." Section 3, 26 Stat. 612 (1890). The 1890 act contained no express agreementmaking authority.
112 48 Stat. 943 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). (Emphasis
added.)
113 Hearings on H.R. 5550, supra note 111, at 67.
114 Ibid. The language of the Ways and Means Committee was quoted in the report
of the Senate Finance Committee.
The constitutionality of the delegation of agreement-making authority is solidly
established. In Hampton &: Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), the Supreme Court
upheld the provision of the Tariff Act of 1922 which delegated wide discretion to the
President to adjust tariffs in order to equalize foreign and domestic costs of production.
See also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), sustaining the validity of certain discretionary
provisions of the Tariff Act of 1890. In Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 47 C.C.P .A.
(Customs) 52 (1959), it was held that the delegation of agreement-making authority under
the trade agreements program is constitutional.
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pansion Act of 1962.115 As originally drafted, this authority was to
be exercised "in order to further the purposes" of the act. 116 Unlike section 350(a)(l) of the 1930 act, no express reference was
made to foreign non-tariff restrictions, although one of the objectives of the act was stated to be the expansion of United States
export markets "by lowering trade barriers."117 An analysis of
the bill prepared by the executive branch explained that despite
the change in language, which was designed to make the requisite
presidential finding less formal, the new provision was "based
largely" on section 350(a)(l).
As finally enacted, the language of section 20l(a) closely resembles that of the prior legislation and continues the explicit
reference to foreign non-tariff import restrictions. It provides:
"Whenever the President determines that any existing
duties or other import restrictions of any foreign country ...
are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the
United States and that any of the purposes stated in section
102 [including stimulation of the domestic economy, enlargement of export markets, and strengthening of economic relations with free-world nations "through the development of
open and nondiscriminatory trading"] will be promoted
thereby, the President may . . . enter into trade agreements
with foreign countries or instrumentalities thereof . . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
As in the case of the previous trade agreements legislation,
therefore, permission to negotiate for the removal of foreign import
restrictions other than tariffs is clearly delegated in the basic
trade agreements authority of the 1962 act. An implicit confirmation of this authority appears in the statement of purposes, which
refers not only to the maintenance and enlargement of United
States markets but also to the achievement of "open and nondiscriminatory trading."
It may also be observed that the 1962 act, like its predecessors,
requires the President to submit annual reports to Congress
on the operation of the trade agreements program. Section 402
specifies that these reports shall include information as to "the
results of action taken to obtain removal of foreign trade restrictions (including discriminatory restrictions) against United States
115
116
117

76 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C. § 182l(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
H.R. 9900, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
Id. § 102.
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exports, remaining restrictions, and the measures available to seek
their removal in accordance with the purposes of this Act ... .'' 118
This language would seem plainly to contemplate presidential
authority to negotiate with foreign nations in seeking the elimination of such restrictions.
The existence of authority to negotiate concerning foreign nontariff barriers does not necessarily define its scope. Part II above
describes a wide range of such restrictions. Some of these may be
maintained by local as readily as by national governments, while
some are attributable wholly to private action. These restrictions
result from a diversity of motives. It has been occasionally suggested that certain of these classes of restrictions may be beyond
the ambit of the President's statutory negotiating authority.
The 1962 act, continuing almost verbatim the language of the
prior trade agreements legislation, defines the phrase "other import
restriction" to include any "limitation, prohibition, charge, and
exaction other than duty, imposed on importation or imposed for
the regulation of imports." 119 This language seems adequate to
reach any form of restriction imposed at the time of importation,
although it might be questioned whether arbitrary customs classification and valuation methods are strictly describable as "limitations, prohibitions, charges or exactions." In regard to restrictions
imposed after the time of entry, however, the language is perhaps
not as unqualified as could be desired, since it might suggest that
in order to be included within the definition the restriction must
have the primary objective of regulation, rather than having
merely the purpose or effect of discriminating against imported
goods. Nonetheless, the long-continued use of virtually identical
language in prior legislation, in conjunction with the clear history
of congressional concern with foreign import restrictions of all
types, strongly supports an unqualified interpretation of the statutory definition.
The converse question relates to the authority of a foreign
government to undertake commitments with respect to certain
classes of restrictions. The legislative history of the 1962 act
contains an occasional suggestion that some restrictions may be
of such an essentially domestic character as to be non-negotiable. 120
118 Section 402(a), 76 Stat. 902, 19 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). The language
is virtually identical with that contained in § 350(e) of the prior law.
119 Section 405(2), 76 Stat. 903, 19 U.S.C. § 1806(2) (Supp. IV, 1963).
120 See, e.g., the comments of Representative Knox during hearings on the bill:
"I was very much concerned about this so-called road tax that was imposed in accordance
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The argument appears to be either that restrictions of this nature
are not within the legal authority of the foreign government to
regulate and are therefore not proper subjects for trade negotiation, or that they involve domestic issues as to which the foreign
government will not wish to assume an international commitment.
In considering this question, it is necessary to distinguish the
domestic authority of the foreign government over certain types
of practice, from its legal capacity to undertake a binding international obligation with respect to them. Since the latter depends
only upon the apparent authority of the negotiator, it follows that
the foreign nation should be able to assume an international obligation to regulate virtually any form of restrictive practice complained of by the United States. Whether it will thereafter be
legally in a position to fulfill its commitment is a separate question
which turns upon its own domestic law.
As a practical matter, of course, the foreign government may
refuse to discuss what it may regard as a purely domestic matter.
Moreover, it would be profitless to seek a concession which, if
granted, could not legally be fulfilled by the other party. It is
possible that in some countries, particularly in those which most
sharply differ from our own in antitrust attitudes, certain forms
of restrictions resulting from private action might be so classified.121

2. Procedures To Obtain Evidence and To Conduct Negotiations
To enable the executive branch to negotiate effectively concerning foreign import restrictions, an adequate mechanism must
be provided by which it can be advised of their existence in specific
instances. It has been suggested in the foregoing discussion that,
although there is much that government officials can and should
do to keep themselves apprised of these restrictions, information
of this nature is most readily available to domestic firms that seek
to sell abroad.
It has always been possible, of course, for private parties to
with horsepower . • • . Is not that actually a foreign-domestic law and could not be
taken into consideration as far as negotiations on tariffs are concerned?" Hearings on
H.R. 9900 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1549
(1962).

"

121 It is perhaps partly for this reason that the questionnaire recently circulated by
the Department of Commerce to United States business firms and trade associations
(see note 25 supra) defines a non-tariff trade barrier as any restrictive governmental
practice, and stipulates that "for the purposes of this questionnaire, this definition does
not include impediments to trade resulting from the operation of foreign cartels, private
monopolies, or other non-governmental business practices."
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advise the government informally concerning foreign import barriers. Information obtained in this manner has frequently constituted the basis of ad hoc diplomatic representations by the United
States to the foreign governments concerned. This technique,
although not an adequate substitute for more formal procedures,
is nonetheless a useful adjunct which will undoubtedly continue
to be employed in many instances.
The hearings required by statute to be held in advance of
trade negotiations have afforded an additional forum for the presentation of such information. Section 4 of the Trade Agreements
Act of 1934, as amended, required that public notice, and an opportunity for interested parties to present their views, be accorded
in advance of any proposed trade agreement. 122 Section 3 of the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, directed
the Tariff Commission to investigate and report, with respect to
each commodity considered for possible inclusion in trade agreement negotiations, the extent to which United States duties or
other import restrictions might be modified without causing or
threatening serious injury to the competitive domestic industry.128
In each instance, data and views were also required to be obtained
from other government departments and agencies. Particularly in
the case of investigations conducted pursuant to section 4 of the
1934 act, domestic industries have frequently included in their
presentations information concerning import restrictions which
they have encountered abroad.
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 has continued the requirement that investigations be held in advance of proposed trade
negotiations. Public hearings are provided before both the Tariff
Commission124 and "an agency or an interagency committee" designated by the President. 125 Preparations for the 1964 round of
tariff negotiations demonstrate that considerably greater attention
is currently being given to foreign import restrictions. The Trade
Information Committee, which is the agency charged with conducting public hearings pursuant to section 223 of the act, has
indicated a particular interest in "non-tariff barriers imposed by
other nations which the United States should seek to have removed
or modified." 126
122
123
124
125
120

48 Stat. 945 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1354 (1958).
65 Stat. 72 (1951), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1360 (1958).
Section 221, 76 Stat. 874-75, 19 U.S.C. § 1841 (Supp. IV, 1963).
Section 223, 76 Stat. 875, 19 U.S.C. § 1843 (Supp. IV, 1963).
Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Negotiations Under
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The increased concern with foreign import restrictions during
pre-negotiation investigations is clearly desirable. It would not,
however, have constituted more than a partial response to the
criticism raised during legislative hearings on the Trade Expansion Act. Much of this criticism was directed to the absence of
formal and definite procedures by which private parties could
present such evidence to government officials at any time. As a
corollary, it was urged that responsibility for receiving and acting
on this evidence was not adequately defined and centralized
within the executive branch. Prior to 1962, the formal hearing
procedure was specifically provided by statute only as a prelude to
trade negotiations. Moreover, responsibility for the administration of the trade agreements program was divided among various
government departments and agencies. The Interdepartmental
Committee on Trade Agreements, which was established to obtain
detailed information and to evolve specific recommendations regarding the operation of the program, was composed of representatives of nine departments and agencies and chaired by the
representative from the Department of State. The Committee for
Reciprocity Information, which conducted pre-negotiation hearings, had generally the same composition but was chaired by the
representative from the Tariff Commission. The cabinet-level
Trade Policy Committee was chaired by the Secretary of Commerce.127
The Trade Expansion Act abolished this tripartite division
of responsibility, and in its place established a single administrative agency which is charged with continuing responsibility for
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Oct. 21, 1963). The Committee is also interested in
United States import restrictions as to which concessions might be offered. Its "Suggestions on the Preparation of Written Briefs and Oral Testimony" contains the following
statement:
"The Committee hopes that witnesses will particularly endeavor to provide it
with specific information on non-tariff barriers which hamper export sales and to
estimate the effects their removal would have upon American exports • • • • Since
many of the restrictions in this category involve, among other elements, varying
degrees of administrative interpretation and discretion, witnesses are urged to
provide fully documented illustrations based on their own experience." Id. at 6.
To the same effect see Ambassador Herter's statement at the White House Conference
on Export Expansion:
"We shall need your more specific help when the Trade Information Committee
holds its hearings . • . . [W]e should like its hearings to focus largely upon
determining which foreign tariffs and trade restrictions are most burdensome to
United States exporters. We hope, therefore, that you will take full advantage of
this opportunity to share with us this vital information, which your first-hand
experience in the markets of the world uniquely qualifies you to give." U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Int'! Commerce 10 (Sept. 23, 1963).
127 See generally Catudel, How a Trade Agreement Is Made, Dep't of State Pub.
No. 7305 (Nov. 1961).
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the trade agreements program. Section 241 128 directs the President
to appoint a Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, who
is to lead the United States delegation at such negotiations and
serve as chairman of the interagency trade organization established
pursuant to section 242.129 This organization, which consists principally of the heads of government departments or their representatives, assists the President in administering the program and
handling tariff adjustment cases.
By Executive Order, the interagency trade organization has
been designated the Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee.180
It supersedes the prior Trade Policy Committee. Similarly, the
Committee for Reciprocity Information has been replaced by the
Trade Information Committee, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements has become the Trade Staff Committee. The latter two committees are chaired by members of the
office of the Special Representative.181 Although the change in
names is unimportant, it is significant that this administrative
structure now reports directly to a single government official who
has express statutory responsibility for assisting the President in
administering the trade agreements program.
The 1962 act also establishes a clearly defined procedure by
which. private parties can, at any time, present evidence of foreign
non-tariff restrictions which they believe to have hindered their
export trade. This procedure has no antecedent in prior trade
agreements legislation. Section 252(d) directs the President to
"provide an opportunity for the presentation of views concerning
foreign import restrictions which . . . are maintained against
United States commerce" and to arrange for public hearings with
respect thereto. 182 This function has been delegated to the Trade
Information Committee.133 A definite procedure has been established by which evidence regarding such restrictions may be sub128 76 Stat. 878, 19 U.S.C. § 1871 (Supp. IV, 1963). The regulations relating to the
establishment, structure, and functions of the Office of the Special Representative appear
at 48 C.F.R. § 201 (1964).
120 76 Stat. 878, 19 U.S.C. § 1871 (Supp. IV, 1963).
130 Exec. Order No. 11075, 28 Fed. Reg. 473 (1963), as amended by Exec. Order No.
11106, 28 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1963), and Exec. Order No. 11113, 28 Fed. Reg. 6183 (1963).
131 See 48 C.F.R. § 202 (1964). There is also a Trade Executive Committee established
by 48 C.F.R. § 202.l (1964). Its membership consists of departmental representatives at
the assistant secretary level. It is chaired by a Deputy Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations.
132 76 Stat. 880, 19 U.S.C. § 1882(d) (Supp. IV, 1963).
133 Exec. Order No. 11075, 28 Fed. Reg. 473 (1963), as amended by Exec. Order No.
11106, 28 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1963), and Exec. Order No. 11113, 28 Fed. Reg. 6183 (1963); 48
C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(2) (1964).
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mitted to the Committee, either in written form or through the
medium of public hearings. 134 Information so obtained is furnished in summary form to the Trade Staff Committee and to the
Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee.135 The Trade Staff
Committee, in turn, reviews the information and transmits its
recommendations through the Trade Executive Committee to the
Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee.186 The latter committee informs the President as to the results of such hearings
and recommends appropriate action. 181
Although it is too early to judge the effectiveness of this new
procedure, it appears to have considerable potential value for
domestic firms which have been able to obtain concrete evidence
of foreign trade barriers.188 Section 252(d) does not limit the types
of restrictions as to which evidence may be presented. By its terms,
the procedure is available irrespective of whether the restrictions
are asserted to be legally justifiable.189 It may be invoked at any
time, and is not contingent upon the existence of a trade concession
with respect to the article involved.140 Its broad availability remedies a deficiency which had become increasingly apparent in prior
trade agreements legislation.
48 C.F.R. § 211.3 (1964).
48 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(2) (1964).
48 C.F.R. § 202.2(b)(3) (1964).
Section 242(b)(3), 76 Stat. 878, 19 U.S.C. § 1872(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1963); Exec. Order
No. 11075, 28 Fed. Reg. 473 (1963), as amended by Exec. Order 11106, 28 Fed, Reg, 3911
(1963), and Exec. Order 11113, 28 Fed. Reg. 6183 (1963).
138 "The importance of this [new procedure] should not be played down. It can be
an effective force in the effort to establish the type of fair trade practices in international
commerce which are essential to the stimulation of increased foreign trade." Separate
Views of Hon. Thomas B. Curtis on H.R. 11970, H. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
98 (1962),
The regulations of the Trade Information Committee indicate that general allegations
as to foreign restrictions will not support a request for a hearing, although the language
of § 252(d) suggests that discretion to refuse a hearing may be limited. 48 C.F.R. § 211.3
(1964) states that a request pursuant to § 252(d) will be granted "only if it identifies with
particularity the foreign import restriction complained of, states the reasons why the
restriction is believed to be of the kind covered by Sec. 252 of the Act, and describes
concisely the effect of the restriction upon United States exports." Attempted use by a
domestic firm of the procedures provided in § 252(d) as a means of obtaining otherwise
unavailable information concerning the business operations of foreign competitors is not
likely to be successful. 48 C.F.R. § 211.8 (1964) exempts from public inspection data submitted in confidence which the Committee considers to be of this character, and permits
the submitting party to withdraw any such data to which the Committee denies confidential status.
139 See also 47 DEP'T STATE Buu.. 847, 849 (Dec. 3, 1962), stating that "a new provision
has been added which requires the interagency trade organization to hold public hearings
at which any interested persons may present their views on unjustifiable and unreasonable
foreign import restrictions."
140 The availability of a remedy may, of course, be affected by the existence or absence
of a trade concession. See text infra.
184
185
136
187
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After specific evidence of foreign import restrictions has been
obtained by the executive branch, international negotiations to
secure their removal may be conducted by a variety of means. It
has been indicated that diplomatic representations are often made
on an ad hoc basis to the foreign governments concerned. In
addition, consultations are frequently conducted pursuant to the
provisions of bilateral or multilateral international undertakings
to which the United States is a party. These primarily include
bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, bilateral
trade agreements,141 and various multilateral arrangements such
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International Monetary Fund. These international undertakings not
only obligate the parties to observe codes of fair trade practice,142
but also establish procedures for handling alleged violations.
These procedures may be illustrated by reference to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Representations concerning
foreign import restrictions may be made by the United States either
in the course of trade negotiations conducted under the auspices
of the General Agreement143 or in accordance with the various
consultation and complaint procedures which the Agreement
specifically provides. The most general of these provisions is
Article XXII, which requires each contracting party to give "sympathetic consideration" and "adequate opportunity for consultation" in the case of representations made by any other party, and
permits the Contracting Parties, acting jointly, to participate in
the consultation at the request of any party involved. Article XXIII
requires each party to consider sympathetically the assertion by
another party that a benefit accruing from the General Agreement is being nullified or impaired. If the parties are unable to
reach an accord, the question may be referred to the Contracting
Parties in their collective capacity. The Contracting Parties may,
141 It should be observed that most bilateral trade agreements concluded by the
United States have been superseded by the subsequent accession of the parties to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
142 The substantive remedial rights to which these arrangements may give rise are
beyond the scope of the present discussion.
143 Non-tariff import restrictions will receive greater consideration in the 1964 tariff
negotiations than on any previous occasion. The resolution adopted by the Ministerial
Conference of the General Agreement on May 21, 1963, outlining principles and procedures
to guide the 1964 negotiations, expressly provides that they "shall deal not only with
tariffs but also with non-tariff barriers." The Conference established a Trade Negotiations
Committee to determine detailed procedure for the negotiations, including the "rules
to govern and the methods to be employed in the treatment of non-tariff barriers."
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in their discretion, authorize compensatory action under Article
XXIII or waive the obligation of a party under Article XXV.
More specific provisions of the General Agreement require any
party maintaining quantitative restrictions for balance of payments
reasons to consult periodically with the Contracting Parties.144
Consultation is also required if a party initiates or substantially
increases such restrictions.145 Various other provisions require
notice or consultation, or authorize compensatory adjustments,
in the case of specific restrictive actions by a party.
Pursuant to the requirement for periodic consultations regarding balance of payments restrictions, the Contracting Parties have
met with a number of countries to examine the extent of these
restrictions, their significance for other parties and their compatibility with the General Agreement. 146 The Contracting Parties
have also required periodic reports from each party maintaining
restrictions inconsistent with the General Agreement, whether or
not within the terms of the protocol of provisional application.
The United States has participated in these consultations and
has invoked the formal complaint procedure on various occasions.
It has recently taken steps under Articles XXIV and XXVIII to
compensate for limitations imposed by the European Economic
Community on imports of poultry from the United States. The
language and legislative history of the Trade Expansion Act
suggest that this country may henceforth be more inclined to
invoke the remedial provisions of the General Agreement in the
case of foreign restrictions on industrial as well as agricultural
commodities.
B. Substantive Authority To Seek Removal of Foreign Non-Tariff
Import Restrictions
Although the President's authority to negotiate regarding
foreign non-tariff import restrictions is clear, a more complex
question arises with respect to the scope of his substantive authority to bargain for or demand their removal. What inducements
may he offer, or in what forms may he threaten retaliation, in order
to achieve his purpose?
144 Article XII requires annual consultations. Article XVIII:B requires consultations
at not less than two-year intervals in the case of less developed countries.
145 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. XII(4)(a), XVIII:B.
146 As an example, consultations were held during 1962 with Brazil, Ceylon, Denmark,
Finland, Ghana, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of South Africa,
and Uruguay.
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It is apparent that the United States has a wide range of possible means available to induce or coerce other nations to discontinue such restrictions. Virtually every aspect of its relations with
an offending nation may afford, at least in theory, a potential
leverage for this purpose. In many instances, the trade agreements
program as such may not be involved. The Randall Commission
has suggested, for example, that the principle of domestic preference contained in the Buy American Act should be suspended in
evaluating bids submitted by nationals of countries whose procurement policies do not discriminate against United States suppliers.147
Such methods for seeking the removal of foreign restrictions
undoubtedly are invoked from time to time. Frequently, however,
they are not well adapted to that purpose. Moreover, their use
may tend to interfere with the achievement of other objectives for
which they were originally intended. For these reasons, the trade
agreements program and related legislation ordinarily provide the
most appropriate measure of the President's delegated authority to
offer reciprocal concessions or to take retaliatory action. 148
To a limited degree, the basic authority to negotiate trade
agreements provides an inherent mechanism both for persuasion
and for coercion. Although the effectiveness of persuasion unaccompanied by the offer of a corresponding concession is plainly
limited, it may occasionally be effective where the inequity of the
foreign restriction is apparent and the reasons for its retention ~re
not compelling. Conversely, the refusal to negotiate further trade
agreements with a country maintaining such restrictions may
comprise a useful form of coercion in some circumstances. Its
effectiveness is considerably limited, however, both by the potential
trade disadvantages to the United States and by the fact that under
the most-favored-nation principle concessions granted in other
trade negotiations ordinarily would become available automatically to the offending nation.
Domestic legislation contains three specific grants of authority
which the President may employ in seeking the removal of foreign
import barriers. One of these provisions, originally enacted in
1890, permits him to refuse entry to articles from a foreign country
147 COMI\USSION ON FOREIGN EcoNOI\UC POLICY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS 45 (1954).
148 As in the case of the authority to negotiate, the present discussion does not consider the extent to which the President may possess independent constitutional authority
in this area.
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which is unjustly discriminating against United States commerce.m
This potentially drastic retaliatory measure is framed in discretionary rather than mandatory language, and by its terms applies
only to discrimination "made by or under the authority of" the
foreign state. It would not appear, therefore, to authorize retaliation in those situations in which the discrimination results from
purely private action. Moreover, as suggested below, the reference
to "unjust" discrimination would presumably be construed to
render the statute inapplicable in the case of restrictions which
are legally valid, however burdensome in effect.
The second specific legislative authorization is contained in
section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.160 Unlike the
preceding provision, section 338 reaches "unreasonable" as well
as unjustifiable restrictions, but is more clearly limited to those
which discriminate in the sense of placing United States commerce
at a disadvantage compared with that of any third country. It
directs the President, within certain limits and to the extent that
he believes the national interest will thereby be benefited, to
retaliate against such discrimination by imposing countervailing
import duties. If this form of retaliation proves ineffective, the
President is authorized, in his discretion, to refuse entry to articles
produced in the offending country or transported in its vessels.
It will be observed that both of these statutory provisions relate
to foreign discrimination against any article of United States commerce. Furthermore, they authorize retaliation against any article
imported from the offending country, whether or not it is subject
to a trade concession granted by the United States. In several
respects, the two provisions differ from the authority contained in
the trade agreements legislation itself.

I. Trade Agreements Authority To Offer Concessions
To Obtain the Removal of Foreign Restrictions
By definition, the basic trade agreements authority permits
the President to offer an inducement in order to secure the removal
of a foreign import restriction. This authority has been continued
without substantive change since the program was initiated, and
currently appears in section 20l(a) of the Trade Expansion Act
, of 1962. This provision permits the President, when he finds that
United States exports are being hindered either by tariffs or by
149
150

26 Stat. 415-16 (1890).
46 Stat. 704, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1338 (1958).
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other import restrictions, to enter into trade agreements and to
"proclaim such modification or continuance of any existing duty
or other import restriction, such continuance of existing dutyfree or excise treatment, or such additional import restrictions, as
he deems to be required or appropriate to carry out any such trade
agreement. " 151
The basic trade agreements authority has consistently limited
the extent to which the President is permitted to adjust tariffs.1112
In addition, his right to do so has, with certain exceptions,153 been
subject to the general obligation to observe the standard of mostfavored-nation treatment. 154 Subject to these qualifications, and
except as limited elsewhere in the act, the President has been free
to offer tariff concessions in return for the reduction or removal
of any form of foreign import restriction. The basic trade agreements authority, however, has not limited his right to modify
or continue United States import restrictions other than tariffs.
Prior to 1962, no other limitation existed in trade agreements
legislation. The only specific delegation of authority to deal with
foreign import restrictions, other than the basic agreement-making
authority itself, was contained in the proviso of section 350(a)(5)
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. It constituted an exception
to the requirement of most-favored-nation treatment which comprised the remainder of the section. The proviso directed the
President to suspend the application of a trade concession to imports from any country which discriminated against United States
commerce or engaged in other acts which in his opinion tended
to defeat the objectives of the trade agreements program. It did
not limit his authority to offer reciprocal concessions in return
for the elimination of such restrictions. 155
Section 20l(a)(2), 76 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C. § 182l(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1963).
Under the 1962 act, the President may not, with certain exceptions (e.g., in the
case of trade with the European Economic Community where certain criteria are met),
reduce a United States tariff by more than 50% below the rate existing on July 1, 1962
(§ 20l(b)(l)), or increase it by more than 50% above the rate existing on July 1, 1934
(§ 201 (b)(2)).
153 The principal exception relates to imports from Communist countries. Insofar as
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is concerned, see § 231, 76 Stat. 876-77, as amended, 19
U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. IV, 1963). The extent to which § 252 of the act constitutes an
additional exception is discussed in text infra.
154 See the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 251, 76 Stat. 879, 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (Supp.
IV, 1963).
155 The directive to suspend concessions where foreign restrictions exist was not
logically incompatible with the existence of authority to offer concessions to remove them.
In any specific case, the President might have concluded, under the pre-1962 legislation,
that retaliation would tend to defeat the purposes of the act whereas the negotiation of
reciprocal concessions would have the opposite effect. He would therefore not have been
151
152

1344

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

The successor to the proviso of section 350(a)(5) is section 252
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Unlike the prior legislation,
section 252 distinguishes between two categories of foreign import
restrictions-those which are "unjustifiable" in the sense that they
violate international obligations such as those contained in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and those which, although legally justifiable, are regarded as "unreasonable." 1 ~6
Section 252(a)(2) specifically precludes the President from "negotiating the reduction or elimination of any United States import
restriction" pursuant to the basic trade agreements authority in
order to obtain the removal of an unjustifiable foreign restriction.
No such limitation appears in the case of unreasonable restrictions.
This modification of prior legislation was deliberate. The
qualifying language did not appear in the bill as originally drafted.
It was added by the House Ways and Means Committee, which
reported, "Your committee feels that the United States should
not make concessions in exchange for removal or reduction of
such unwarranted restrictions." 157 Administration witnesses took
the same position. Under Secretary of State George Ball advised
the Ways and Means Committee that, insofar as unjustifiable
foreign restrictions are concerned, "we shouldn't pay anything for
the elimination of these and we don't intend to." In those cases
in which the restrictions are legal but disadvantageous to United
States commerce, he concluded that "this is a matter where we
can use the bargaining powers that are provided under the Trade
Act as well as we use them to obtain reductions in tariffs, and we
intend to do so." 158

2. Trade Agreements Authority To Impose Domestic Import
Restrictions To Obtain the Removal of Foreign Restrictions
Trade agreements legislation has always authorized the President, in specified circumstances, to impose domestic import
bound by the proviso of § 350(a)(5) and would have been free to act pursuant to § 350(a)(l).
Alternatively, he might initially have invoked the proviso, and thereafter, if retaliation
proved unsuccessful, have concluded a new agreement under § 350(a)(l) in order to
achieve his purpose. Furthermore, the proviso could not logically have been construed
as an implied prohibition against offering concessions to secure the removal of restrictions
imposed by nations which had received no previous concessions from the United States.
156 For one discussion of this distinction, see testimony of Under Secretary of State
George Ball, Hearings on H.R. 11970 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2204-05, 2264 (1962). The House and Senate committee reports also
recognize the distinction. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1962).
157 H. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1962).
158 Hearings on R.R. 11970, supra note 156, at 2246.
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restrictions as a means of seeking the removal of foreign trade
barriers. An express statutory provision for this purpose has been
included in each successive enactment of the program. 1119 It has
been noted above that prior to 1962 this provision directed the
President to suspend concessions to any country imposing restrictions which in his view tended to nullify the objectives of the
program.160 The statutory language was succinct. It did not
distinguish between these restrictions on the basis of their legal
validity. 161 With the exception of a single parenthetical reference
to international cartels, it avoided the uncertainties which tend
to result from the inclusion of specific examples in legislation of
general applicability. By contrast, section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act is verbose and repetitive. It contains ambiguities
caused largely by provisions designed to benefit particular interests.
The section classifies foreign restrictions according to legal distinc169 The basic trade agreements authority may afford an additional ground for retaliatory action. Section 20l(a)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act permits the President to proclaim "such additional import restrictions, as he deems to be required or appropriate
to carry out any such trade agreement." Prior trade agreements legislation contained
virtually identical language. The provision has customarily been regarded as authorizing
increases in duties or other import restrictions pursuant to an escape clause or tariff
adjustment action. It would also appear, however, to permit the President, if he finds
that the benefits of a trade concession obtained by the United States are being impaired
as a result of restrictions imposed by the nation granting the concession, to take retaliatory
action as a means of persuading that nation to "carry out" the trade agreement according
to its original terms. Such action would, of course, be proper only if consistent with the
purposes stated in § 102 of the act.
Although no instance is known in which retaliation has been sought to be justified by
reference to the basic trade agreements authority, there would seem to be no conceptual
difficulty with this approach. Its potential significance results from the fact that the scope
of permissible action under § 201 would differ from that under § 252. Under the former
provision, the President could retaliate against any article imported from a country which
imposes restrictions impairing the value of a concession previously granted to the United
States, if he considered that such action would encourage the offending country to honor
its original commitment. Under § 252, by contrast, he is limited to the withdrawal of
concessions granted by the United States to that country. On the other hand, under § 252
the President may retaliate against any restriction imposed by another country, whether
or not it affects an article as to which the United States has received a concession.
Section 201 would permit him to take such action only to protect the value of a concession
previously obtained by the United States. The scope of retaliation under § 201 would
therefore be both broader and narrower than under § 252.
160 Prior to 1955, the language was permissive rather than mandatory. Since in either
case retaliation was contingent on presidential discretion as to the impact of foreign
restrictions on the operation of the act, the 1955 amendment can only be regarded as a
mild form of legislative exhortation.
161 In practice, the United States has consistently invoked this distinction when
deciding whether to take retaliatory action pursuant to the proviso of § 350(a)(5). Where,
for example, foreign restrictions have been sanctioned for balance of payments reasons
under articles XII or XIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, this country
has refused to apply the proviso on the ground that the restrictions neither discriminate
against United States commerce nor tend to defeat the objectives of the trade agreements
program. See, e.g., Metzger, The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 51 GEo. L.J. 425, 436 (1963).
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tions which, although important, may prove to extend its language
more than they affect its administration.
The retaliatory provisions of section 252 are best understood
by reference to their legislative history. As originally drafted by
the executive branch, they followed closely the language of the
proviso of section 350(a)(5).162 The Ways and Means Committee
rewrote the. section in a manner intended to emphasize congressional concern with illegal foreign restrictions. To this end, the
committee (I) added language characterizing such restrictions as
"unjustifiable" or "inconsistent with provisions of trade agreements," (2) amplified the directive to the President to withhold
trade concessions from the offending nation by specifying not only
that he is to suspend, but alternatively that he is to withdraw, prevent the application of, or refrain from proclaiming such concessions,168 and (3) directed the President generally to "take all appropriate and feasible steps within his power," other than offering
reciprocal concessions, in order to remove foreign restrictions.m
As noted above, the first of these changes makes explicit the
interpretation which the executive branch had consistently given
to the previous statutory language. The second has a comparable effect. The third might initially appear to have a broader
significance. Depending on the construction given to the words
"appropriate and feasible," which would presumably be determined by the President, the language could be regarded on its face
as authorizing retaliation in any form against any article imported
from a country maintaining unjustifiable restrictions adversely
affecting United States commerce. For several reasons, however,
such an interpretation is unlikely. First, it would represent a
major extension in the scope of the retaliatory authority as consistently embodied in prior trade agreements legislation. Despite
increased congressional concern with foreign restrictive devices,
there is no indication in the legislative history of the 1962 act that
any such sweeping alteration was intended. Second, so broad an
authorization would necessarily include, an~ thereby render superSection 242, H.R. 9900, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
It may be observed that under this provision, as under prior trade agreements
legislation, the President may withdraw all existing concessions on a commodity. In such
a case, the effect would be to return to the rate of duty established by the Tariff Act
of 1930. See Dep't of State memorandum, Hearings on R.R. 11970, supra note 156, at 2278.
164 For these amendments, see generally § 252, H.R. 11970 in the House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). As noted supra, the committee also added to § 252 a
paragraph specifying the procedure by which information concerning foreign restrictions
can be presented to the executive branch.
162
163
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fl.nous, the more limited language providing for the withdrawal of
concessions. Consistency between the two provisions is assured only
if the former is regarded as merely hortatory. Finally, the Senate
appears to have followed this interpretation in adopting the
Williams amendment, 165 which provides for a broader scope of
retaliatory action than might be required if the House language
embodied an additional substantive authority.
The net effect of the retaliatory amendments adopted by the
Ways and Means Committee, therefore, is to focus attention on
the existence of these remedial measures and to communicate more
forcefully to the executive branch the intention that they be used.
The committee report states:
"Your committee does not believe that there can be effective use of the trade agreement process to lower trade barriers .
if unjustifiable restrictions of a tariff or nontariff nature are
maintained or erected, or other actions are taken which are
inconsistent with trade agreement commitments . . . . Your
committee expects that every reasonable effort will be made
to bring about the removal of such unjustifiable restrictions
so that the objectives of the trade agreements program will be
attained. Your committee also expects that as new obstructions to trade appear, every reasonable effort will be made
to stop them." 166
The purpose of the House amendments is commendable. As a
matter of legislative drafting, however, it is regrettable that the
method adopted was to extend and complicate unnecessarily the
statutory language. The consequence was to create apparent distinctions which in fact do not exist.
The preceding discussion has indicated that the separate and
coordinate treatment of the authority to "take all appropriate and
feasible steps" to remove unjustifiable foreign restrictions, and the
authority to withdraw trade concessions for this purpose, might
seem to suggest the delegation of two substantive powers where
only one was intended. Similarly, the drafting distinction between countries maintaining restrictions "inconsistent with provisions of trade agreements" and those engaged in acts "unjustifiably restricting United States commerce"167 could logically imply
165 Section 252(a)(3), 76 Stat. 879 (1962), 19 U.S.C. § 1882(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1963). See
text infra.
166 H. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1962).
167 Sections 252(b)(l), (2), 76 Stat. 879 (1962), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1882(b)(l), (2) (Supp. IV, 1963).
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a legal distinction not contemplated by the legislation. In fact,
the separate reference to restrictions inconsistent with trade agreements may have been primarily intended as a drafting vehicle for
the inclusion of language relating specifically to variable import
fees, which were. of particular concern to agricultural interests.
Instead of simplifying the House language, the Senate further
complicated it. The two principal additions were the Williams
amendment, relating to agricultural products, and the Douglas
amendment, which is concerned with foreign restrictions that are
"unreasonable" but not illegal. Although the Williams amendment is included in the portion of section 252 which by its terms
relates exclusively to unjustifiable restrictions, and although grammatically the amendment refers only to such restrictions, it nonetheless provides for retaliatory action "notwithstanding any provision of any trade agreement under this Act." Moreover,
retaliation is not limited to the withdrawal of trade concessions,
but may consist of either tariff or non-tariff restrictions applied
against any article imported from the offending country. In the
case of agricultural products, therefore, the amendment significantly extends the prior legislative authority to retaliate. 168 It
reflects the underlying concern with foreign agricultural restrictions, particularly those maintained by the European Economic
Community, which largely influenced the drafting of section 252.
The Douglas amendment is a logical consequence of the House
revisions which had limited the scope of section 252 to foreign
restrictions that are legally unjustifiable. In order to preserve the
President's right under the trade agreements legislation to retaliate
against foreign trade barriers which, although legal, are burdensome to United States commerce,169 it was necessary either to revert
168 The Senate version of the Williams amendment gave the President no discretion
to refrain from taking retaliatory action against imports from countries maintaining
restrictions on United States agricultural exports, except that he was permitted to determine the extent to which retaliation was necessary to remove the restrictions and to
obtain access to the foreign market. The House accepted the amendment with the
modification that the President is required to retaliate only "to the extent he deems
necessary and appropriate." H.R. REP. No. 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
169 As discussed in text infra, exercise of this authority could involve the United States
in a breach of its international obligations. Its existence, however, may be helpful in
negotiating with the offending country. See the statement of the Senate Finance Committee:
"It is anticipated that the authority of the new subsection (c) of section 252 will
prove useful in direct negotiations with other countries as a means of persuading
them to reduce unreasonably high import restrictions prior to the bargaining process
or as the means for inducing that country to end its discriminatory treatment of
goods from third countries, or to induce a third country benefiting indirectly
from U.S. concessions to grant the U.S. concessions in return for such indirect benefits."
S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962).

1964]

NON-TARIFF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

1349

to the earlier formula contained in the proviso of section 35O(a)(5)
of the Tariff Act of 1930 or to incorporate an additional provision
dealing specifically with this category of restrictions. The Senate
chose the latter course. It recognized, however, that retaliation
against justifiable trade barriers might involve the United States
in an undesirable breach of its international commitments. Accordingly, whereas retaliation in the case of unjustifiable restrictions is mandatory to the extent that it is consistent with the
purposes of the act, in the case of unreasonable restrictions the
statutory language is permissive. Moreover, in the latter case
the President is to consider not only the purposes of the act but
also the international obligations of the United States. The purpose of the second qualification is, as stated by the Senate Finance
Committee, to avoid "any indiscriminate breach" of such obligations.170
As finally adopted, therefore, section 252, like prior trade
agreements legislation, authorizes retaliation against foreign restrictions on non-agricultural imports only to the extent of
withdrawing concessions previously granted to the offending
country or refusing to proclaim concessions negotiated but not
yet in effect. In the case of foreign agricultural restrictions, section
252 permits retaliation against any article imported from that
country, at least where the restriction is unjustified. In all cases,
the President's obligation to act in accordance with the purposes
of the statute affords him considerable discretion to decline to
take retaliatory measures.
During legislative consideration of the 1962 act, various additional amendments were proposed which were designed to
encourage the use of retaliation against foreign trade barriers.
These proposals were of two general types. The first would have
extended the application of the retaliatory authority in all cases
to commodities not subject to trade concessions and would have
enlarged the sanctions which the President could invoke. The
second would have limited his discretion to refrain from taking
retaliatory action. The fact that the Congress declined to adopt
these proposals affords additional evidence of the scope of the
authority as finally enacted.
The first of these categories is illustrated by the proposal to
supplement the provision for the withdrawal of concessions granted
to an offending country, by authorizing the President to "impose
110

Ibid.
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additional import restrictions on the products of such country."171
This proposal would have extended to all products the additional
authority specifically delegated by the Williams amendment in
the case of agricultural commodities.
The Senate Finance Committee proposed an amendment in
even broader terms. It would have authorized the President, whenever -he found such action to be in the national interest, to impose
new or increased duties or other import restrictions to whatever
extent he deemed necessary on any imported article. 172 The committee asserted:
· "This additional authority ... is ... based on the national
interest and is intended to give the President broad powers
to meet any trends toward unreasonable foreign restrictions
on U.S. exports or exports from third countries which must
otherwise find a market in the United States. This provision
strengthens the President's hand in any negotiations or representations to foreign governments when any unreasonable
restrictions on U.S. trade are being imposed abroad." 178
The Finance Committee proposal largely reflected legislative
conc~rn that the President's powers might not be adequate to
secure the removal of foreign trade restrictions. On several occasions during hearings on the bill, the suggestion was made that
he be delegated authority to "increase" duties for this purpose. 174
171 Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 156, at 1322-23. There is some indication that
the proposal was predicated on the erroneous assumption that subparagraphs (A) and
(B) of § 252(b) only authorize the withdrawal of tariff concessions. The brief in support
of the proposed subparagraph (C) states that "subsections [(A) and (B)] approach the
problem from the duty standpoint. The proposed amendment authorizes an approach
from an additional angle. There will be instances where the suspension, withdrawal, etc.,
of a duty might not provide the necessary leverage but the imposition of additional import restrictions on products of a recalcitrant country would force that country to live
up to its obligations by removing unjustified barriers," Other language in the brief
recognizes, however, that concessions may take the form either of reduction (or binding)
of duties or of "removal of restriction or barriers to trade."
172 Section 353, H.R. 11970 in the Senate· of the United States, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962). Section 353 would have delegated this authority unreservedly "notwithstanding
any other provision of law," upon a finding by the President that such action would be
in the national interest.
178 S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
174 See, e.g., the comments of Senator Douglas, Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note
156, at 168-70, and his statement at 1879:
"I tend to favor an amendment which would give to the President the power to
increase tariffs if that power can be used to obtain decreases in the tariffs or
restrictions which other countries impose upon us. But I do not want to negate the
basic principle _of the Trade Expansion Act. I would like to have this as an excep•
tion to the powers granted to the President, and as a supplementary power granted
to him to induce the European countries to reduce their tariffs in case mutual
reductions are not sufficient to move them."
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Administration officials pointed out that, because the United States
has given concessions on most imported articles since 1930, the
authority to withdraw concessions in fact comprises a substantial
authority to increase duties. 175 Furthermore, they correctly observed that an unjustified increase in duty, whether or not effected
through the withdrawal of a concession, would necessitate compensatory concessions to, or give rise to a right of retaliation by,
any adversely affected party to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade.176
The provision adopted by the Finance Committee would have
conferred an unqualified discretion on the President. Unlike
the authority to withdraw concessions, it would have been subject
to no standards except his judgment as to the national interest. In
addition to providing a further basis for retaliation, therefore, it
would have comprised a continuing invitation to circumvent the
statutory criteria for tariff adjustment and other forms of relief
to domestic interests. Largely for these reasons, it was deleted by
the conference committee.177
Another proposal to increase the severity of retaliatory sanctions would have required at least partial return to the standard
of conditional most-favored-nation treatment. Since 1923, the
United States has followed an unconditional most-favored-nation
policy by which trade concessions granted to any country are automatically generalized to others without regard to benefits obtained
from them in return. 178 The principal motivations for this policy
have been to broaden the liberalizing impact of concessions on
international trade and to reduce the complexity of negotiations.
An integral element of its effectiveness has been the adoption of
comparable policies by other nations.
By contrast, under the policy of conditional most-favored-nation treatment, the generalization of trade benefits to third
countries is a negotiating matter which depends upon the offer
of equivalent concessions. During the legislative hearings, it was
See note 163 supra.
Statement of Assistant Secretary of Commerce Jack. N. Behrman, Hearings on H.R.
11970, supra note 156, at 170. See also letter from Secretary Hodges to Senator Douglas,
id. at 2280-81.
177 H.R. REP. No. 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1962). For one statement of objections
to § 353, see individual views of Senator Carl T. Curtis on H.R. 11970, S. REP. No. 2059,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1962).
178 A limited number of exceptions to this principle have been adopted by statute.
These have included preferential treatment to certain countries and denial of mostfavored-nation treatment to others. As noted at note 153, supra, the principal exception
today is the denial of such benefits to Communist countries.
175
176
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suggested that a return to this policy might provide further leverage for the removal of foreign import restrictions.179 It would
almost certainly have caused other countries, however, to curtail
most-favored-nation treatment to the United States. In view of the
adverse consequences to United States exports, as well as to international trade generally, it is fortunate that the proposal was not
adopted.
The second type of proposed amendment would have qualified
the President's discretion to refrain from retaliating against foreign trade barriers. One method suggested for this purpose was to
delete the statutory reference to the purposes of the act in the
provision relating to the withdrawal of concessions.180 This change
would have made retaliation mandatory against every foreign
restriction to which the provision applied. It was further suggested
that the word "unjustifiable" also be deleted, thereby requiring
the application of sanctions in the case of any foreign restriction
against United States commerce irrespective of its legal validity.181
A third proposal would have amended the agreement-making
authority to require each such agreement to prohibit enumerated
discriminatory practices, thereby limiting presidential discretion
to determine whether these specific acts by foreign countries were
intended to be made subject to the retaliatory sanction.182
Although some of the foregoing proposals were undoubtedly
179 See, e.g., the inquiry of Senator Douglas, Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 156,
at '22.77. As advocated during the hearings, the proposal to "deny most-favored-nation
treatment" had several possible meanings, including (1) to preclude the generalization of
any trade concession to a nation other than the one with which it was negotiated; (2) to
suspend most-favored-nation treatment to any nation imposing import restiictions on any
United States export (Hearings on H.R. 9900 Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1235 (1962)); (3) to suspend the generalization of any trade
concession to a nation declining to grant as favorable terms to the comparable commodity
imported from the United States (id. at 1546); (4) to suspend the generalization of any
such concession to a nation discriminating against imports from third countries (id. at
3132). It is apparent that, in differing degrees, these proposals would have extended the
sanctions available under § 252.
180 Id. at 2773. See also the amendments to H.R. 11970 proposed by Senator Bush,
Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 156, at 1128.
181 Ibid. Senator Bush maintained that deletion of the word "unjustifiable" would
not make presidential action mandatory where the foreign restriction was legal. He based
his argument on the fact that the proposed amendment would retain the provision for
retaliation against restrictions "inconsistent with provisions of trade agreements." Id.
at 1854-55. It would also, however, have required such action in the case of foreign import
barriers that were otherwise restrictive of United States commerce. Since the two provisions were alternative and coordinate, his amendment would clearly have made retaliation mandatory even in the case of justifiable restrictions.
182 Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 179, at 2773. By its terms, the proposal would
have amended only the special authority to conclude trade agreements with the European
Economic Community.

1964]

NON-TARIFF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS

1353

motivated by protectionist sentiments, it seems clear that others
resulted from a genuine concern that foreign non-tariff restrictions
might vitiate the benefits sought to be obtained through reductions in rates of duty. It is to be hoped that the legislative history
will be useful in prompting remedial action by the executive branch
in appropriate cases. In view of the close interrelationships that
necessarily exist, however, between international trade policy and
other foreign economic and political objectives of the United
States, it would have been unwise to deprive the President of discretion to determine whether specific circumstances warrant imposition of the statutory sanctions.
It should be presumed that the United States will normally
wish to exercise these sanctions consistently with its international
obligations. Before deciding what action to take regarding a foreign import restriction, therefore, the United States must ascertain
whether the restriction is legally valid. In event of controversy,
it will presumably be necessary to invoke the mechanism for
resolving such disputes provided in the instrument asserted to
have been infringed. In the most common case, this will be the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It has been noted that
under Article XXIII of the General Agreement, a contracting
party which believes that a benefit accruing under the Agreement
is being impaired by the action of another party, and which receives no satisfaction in bilateral consultations, may raise the
question with the Contracting Parties collectively. The Contracting Parties may, if they believe the circumstances warrant, authorize the offended party to retaliate to the extent they deem
appropriate, irrespective of whether they conclude that the original impairment was the result of action inconsistent with the
obligations of the Agreement. In exceptional circumstances, they
may grant the offending party a waiver under Article XXV even
if the action involved has violated the Agreement.
The provisions of section 252 and those of the General Agreement thus do not fully correspond. If the United States were to
assert that a given foreign import restriction violates the Agreement, and the Contracting Parties were to permit retaliation
without affirming the violation, a question might arise as to
whether the criterion of "unjustifiability" under section 252 had
technically been met. 183 Conversely, if the Contracting Parties were
183 In this event, the United States could presumably base retaliation on the "unreasonable" rather than the "unjustifiable" authority of § 252.
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to recognize the violation but waive the obligation, retaliation
pursuant to section 252 might be inconsistent with the commitments of the United States under the General Agreement.184
It is conceivable that the foreign nation imposing the restriction may be neither a party to a multilateral international undertaking such as the General Agreement nor to any commercial
treaty, trade agreement, or other bilateral instrument defining its
trade obligations toward the United States. Moreover, import
restrictions of the types under consideration are not normally
within the purview of customary international law. In these circumstances, retaliation under section 252 would presumably not
violate any international obligation of the United States. It would,
however, be necessary to characterize the foreign restriction as
"unreasonable" rather than "unjustifiable" within the meaning of
that section.
In seeking to invoke the provisions of section 252(c), relating
to unreasonable restrictions substantially burdening United States
commerce, comparable considerations apply. Although on its face
this determination is to be made unilaterally by the United States,
in fact the withdrawal of a trade concession where the action of
the other party is not illegal (or where, under the General Agreement, the Contracting Parties have not authorized retaliation irrespective of the legality of the original restriction) might involve
the United States in a breach of its international obligations.185

IV.

CONCLUSION

The executive branch has long possessed authority under trade
agreements and other legislation to seek the removal of foreign
import restrictions other than tariffs. In part, this authority is inherent in the statutory right to conclude trade agreements with
foreign nations; in part, it derives from express legislative pro184 These distinctions between § 252 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
arise from the fact that the latter instrument recognizes that commitments between the
contracting parties are based on the principle of mutual benefit. Consequently, where
circumstances have sufficiently altered, the General Agreement may allow commitments
to be modified although no breach of contractual obligation by another party may have
occurred. The same essentially pragmatic attitude underlies the waiver provision. It may
not always be possible, on the technical level, to reconcile this approach with that of
§ 252, which is framed in terms of legal rather than economic justification.
lSIS It is for this reason that § 252(c) provides for retaliation "to the extent that such
action is consistent with" the objectives of the act, and directs the President to have
a "due regard for the international obligations of the United States." The effect of the
statutory language is therefore hortatory.
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v1s1ons relating to the use of inducement or coercion for this
purpose.
It is frequently asserted that the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
significantly broadens these statutory powers. Secretary of Commerce Hodges, in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee,
expressed the view that the bill "strengthens our hand against both
tariff and nontariff barriers." 186 The 1963 report of the President
on the trade agreements program asserts that "the new Act
strengthens previous provisions for dealing with unjustifiable or
unreasonable restrictions that impede the access of American
products to foreign markets."187
In fact, however, the 1962 act narrows rather than extends the
. President's statutory right to offer trade concessions to obtain the
removal of foreign restrictions. Except in the case of agricultural
products, it does not significantly affect the scope of his power
under trade agreements legislation to retaliate against such restrictions. It makes no change in prior statutory provisions authorizing
him to impose additional duties on, or to exclude, articles imported
from countries discriminating against United States commerce.
These latter sanctions, which are not part of the trade agreements
program, are potentially severe. Like the retaliatory provisions
contained in trade agreements legislation, however, they have
rarely been invoked.
It may be concluded that these statutory powers afford the
President adequate authority to act with respect to foreign nontariff import barriers. In practice, however, his freedom to do
so is circumscribed by pragmatic considerations which legislation
cannot resolve. He must act within the context of a system of international obligations which the United States will not ordinarily
wish to breach. In practice, therefore, the negotiation of reciprocal
concessions will probably continue to be the preferred means of
obtaining the removal of foreign restrictions which are legally
justifiable.188
It should also be recognized that nations which persist in maintaining legally indefensible restrictions, despite strong external
pressures to remove them, may be motivated by compelling domestic reasons which the withdrawal of a trade concession or the
Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 156, at 54.
PRESIDENT'S 7TH ANN. REP. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 18 (1963).
In the case of a restriction which, although inconsistent with the General Agree•
ment, has been granted a waiver by the Contracting Parties, a question might arise as to
the propriety of offering a concession under § 252(a)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act.
186
187
188
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imposition of additional import restrictions by the United States
is unlikely to outweigh. In many instances, however, restrictions
originally justified for balance of payments or other reasons are
continued primarily at the urging of domestic interest groups
which have become accustomed to rely upon them. Under such
circumstances, the statutory sanctions available to the President
may prove effective.
Finally, any exercise of retaliation is pro tanto a further restriction upon trade. Moreover, even where it is legally justified it may
invite reciprocal action by the affected nation. For these reasons,
the executive branch will presumably resort to retaliation principally in those instances in which it appears likely to have a
relatively prompt remedial effect.
The primary significance of section 252, therefore, is not that
it effects a major change in the substantive power to eliminate
foreign non-tariff import barriers, but rather that it constitutes a
mandate to the executive branch to give greater attention to the
disruptive effects of these barriers and to undertake determined
efforts to remove them. The more formal and definite procedures
for this purpose established by the 1962 act are potentially its most
important contribution to this end. Their effectiveness will depend
not only on the seriousness with which the problem of foreign
restrictions is regarded within the executive branch, but also upon
the vigor and thoroughness with which private parties prepare
and present their cases through the mechanism provided by section 252(d). Effective utilization of this procedure could have a
substantial influence on the eventual success of the United States
in expanding foreign markets for its products.

